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PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLICNESS 
Onnig H. Dombalagian* 
Abstract 
What duties does a “public” company owe investors, markets, and 
society? In recent years, Congress has both strengthened and diluted the 
federal disclosure and corporate governance regime that applies to public 
companies in the United States. However, it has never articulated a 
framework for what it means to be “public,” and how the obligations of 
public companies should reflect the needs of the constituencies whose 
financial and social interests they affect. As a result, firms fear that 
becoming public is an impediment to growth, and they game gradations of 
publicness to avoid compliance burdens. This Article proposes reframing 
the regulation of public companies under U.S. securities law around three 
regulatory principles: (1) suitability, (2) efficiency, and (3) 
representativeness. These principles—and associated tiers of regulation—
will enable stock exchanges, investment banks, and other market 
intermediaries to shepherd companies toward heightened degrees of public 
exposure and accountability as their capital-raising needs evolve. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What duties do “public” companies owe investors, markets, and 
society? Policy makers and academics have struggled to provide a 
satisfactory answer to this question for over eight decades, and Congress 
has revisited the issue more than once in recent years.1 The Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–Oxley)2 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–Frank) strengthened 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary 
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 339–41 (2013) [hereinafter 
Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness]; A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited: 
Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 
1013–18 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
137, 143 (2011). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the U.S. Code). 
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the disclosure and corporate governance obligations of public companies,3 
while the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act) later 
exempted “emerging growth companies” from many of those same 
obligations.4 Commentators who favor deregulation question the utility and 
indiscriminate application of the disclosure, verification, and governance 
requirements that federal securities law imposes on public companies.5 
Meanwhile, advocates of greater public accountability lament that 
deregulatory mandates threaten not only the transparency and 
accountability of corporations to society but also individual investors’ 
access to public trading opportunities.6 
The debate endures in part because federal securities law has never 
satisfactorily answered two fundamental questions: (1) what does it mean 
for a company to be “public”?; and (2) how should the law calibrate the 
obligations of “public” companies to the constituencies whose financial 
and social interests they affect? As Professors Donald Langevoort and 
Robert Thompson have recounted in a series of recent articles, the 
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (Exchange Act) assume two very different models of publicness in 
imposing disclosure standards, governance requirements, compliance 
burdens, and other regulatory obligations on companies subject to U.S. 
law.7 The disconnect between these Acts reflects their different 
                                                                                                                     
 3. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the U.S. Code). 
 4. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
 5. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 16–19 (2012); Jill E. Fisch, Leave It To Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay out of 
Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 744–69 (2013) (criticizing Congress’s attempt to 
federalize certain aspects of corporation law under Dodd–Frank in response to perceived failures of 
Delaware law); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (questioning the soundness of the mandatory corporate 
governance provisions of Sarbanes–Oxley in light of the empirical finance and accounting 
literature). 
 6. See Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. 
L. REV. 745, 799–801 (2013) (noting the consolidation of share ownership and arguing that 
expanding private securities markets will “crowd out” retail investors); Elizabeth Pollman, 
Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 235–41 (2012); Usha Rodrigues, 
Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3394 (2013) (arguing that private 
markets create “stock exchanges for the rich”). 
 7. See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private 
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (2013) [hereinafter 
Thompson & Langevoort, Redrawing] (contrasting the regulatory regimes applicable to public and 
private capital-raising transactions under federal securities law); Langevoort & Thompson, 
Publicness, supra note 1, at 343–46 (debating the breakpoints at which companies should assume 
public disclosure and corporate governance obligations under federal securities law); Donald C. 
Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, IPOs and the Slow Death of Section 5, 102 KY. L.J. 891, 911–
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backstories8 and the fundamental difference in their approaches: the 
Securities Act regulates the process of “becoming” public, whereas the 
Exchange Act regulates the status of “being” public. 
As a practical matter, federal securities regulators and policy makers 
have historically deferred to exchanges, investment banks, market makers, 
and other market intermediaries to craft heightened degrees of public 
exposure and accountability as the capital-raising needs of companies (or 
the liquidity needs of their shareholders) evolve.9 As federal securities law 
has calcified around metrics for scaling regulatory obligations,10 market 
intermediaries have lost the flexibility to consider novel combinations of 
privileges and obligations, while policy makers have buried much of the 
principle that underlies the spirit of the law. Moreover, as companies 
increasingly find themselves in the cross fire of hot-button social issues, 
policy makers ratchet up disclosure without revisiting the multiplicity of 
roles that securities law plays.11 In response, issuers increasingly perceive 
the cost of publicness as an impediment to growth and may game the 
boundary between gradations of publicness to delay or avoid compliance 
burdens.12 
For securities law to regain its footing, the answers to these questions 
must be grounded in principle. When the goal of regulation is solely to 
level the playing field between issuers and security holders, the law should 
mandate governance, disclosure, and compliance mechanisms only to the 
extent that investors lack the sophistication and leverage to protect 
themselves. If confidence in the fairness and efficiency of securities 
markets requires heightened regulation, the law should identify the 
constituencies whose confidence is at issue and weigh the costs of 
additional obligations against the benefits to those market participants. 
                                                                                                                     
12 (2013–14) [hereinafter Langevoort & Thompson, IPOs] (discussing the erosion of the Securities 
Act’s restrictions on the marketing of public offerings). 
 8. See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 49–72 (3d ed. 
2003) (recounting history of the Securities Act); id. at 73–100 (recounting the history of the 
Exchange Act). 
 9. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 21–41 (1970) 
(describing the role and demise of self-regulation in the decades preceding the enactment of the 
Securities Act); see also Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO 
Identity Crisis, 1 BROOKLYN J. FIN. CORP. & COM. L. 317, 318–23 (2006) [hereinafter Dombalagian, 
Identity Crisis]. 
 10. See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, The Law and Economics of Scaled Equity Market Regulation, 39 
J. CORP. L. 347, 349–50 (2014) [hereinafter Schwartz, Law and Economics] (discussing the trend to 
“gloss over” the justifications for regulatory scaling). 
 11. See Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 372–73, 375–79 (describing 
contemporary securities regulation as a “joint project of experimentation in investor protection 
coupled with a public-driven demand for more transparency, voice, and accountability”). 
 12. See id. at 347; Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 
2 (2012). 
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Finally, if public companies have business relationships that are deeply 
interwoven in the fabric of the economy and polity of the United States, the 
U.S. disclosure and corporate governance regime should focus primarily on 
the nexus between the privileges and obligations created by those 
relationships. 
This Article proposes reframing the regulation of public companies 
under U.S. federal securities law around three well-worn regulatory 
principles: (1) suitability, (2) efficiency, and (3) representativeness. The 
association of particular privileges, obligations, and regulated 
intermediaries with these principles is not talismanic; indeed, much of the 
law that governs public companies relies on these principles, implicitly or 
explicitly. Consequently, such principles can serve as a focal point for 
negotiating transitions from private to public based on the capital-raising 
needs of issuers and the needs of their investors, capital markets, and 
society. More specifically, recasting many of the privileges and obligations 
of federal securities law around “core principles” administered by self-
regulatory bodies and regulated entities permits greater flexibility in their 
application over time.13 
Part I of this Article briefly recites the connotations of being or 
becoming “public,” focusing on the burdens and benefits associated with 
being public or private in U.S. capital markets. Part II considers the 
transitions that companies face as they evolve from private to public—
changes in control, transparency, and responsibility for the externalities of 
their business and capital-raising activities. Part III contrasts the traditional 
issuer-driven approach to determining how public an issuer would like to 
be with the increasing use of metrics to determine how public an issuer 
ought to be. Finally, Part IV explores an approach by which the trade-offs 
associated with various tiers of publicness may coalesce around the 
principles of suitability, efficiency, and representativeness. 
I.  GRADATIONS OF PUBLICNESS 
When policy makers speak of the obligations of public companies, they 
evoke the fabled “sweet spot” in the securities marketplace. In the United 
States, one might think of a corporation that: (1) is listed on a national 
exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the NASDAQ 
Stock Market (NASDAQ); (2) has shares that are actively and efficiently 
                                                                                                                     
 13. In the context of trading rules and business conduct regulation, policy makers have 
advocated the articulation of “core principles” by legislation, while leaving it to self-regulatory 
bodies, such as securities and futures exchanges and dealer associations, to interpret and implement 
them. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE 109–13 (Mar. 2008), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps110157/
Blueprint.pdf; see also 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(1) (2012) (setting forth “core principles” for the regulation 
of designated contract markets for futures trading). 
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traded by market makers and institutional investors informed by regulatory 
disclosures and outside information gathered by securities analysts; (3) is 
governed by a board elected by, and accountable to, public shareholders; 
and (4) offers products and services that command a national or 
international reach.14 Of course, most companies do not spring fully 
formed from the forehead of Mammon: companies accumulate such 
privileges and assume heightened responsibilities by virtue of their capital-
raising and business decisions15 as well as the willingness of market 
participants and intermediaries to finance their progress toward various 
“financial milestones.”16 
Nevertheless, whether one views publicness as a progressive series of 
stages in the “lifecycle” of a company17 or simply as a series of unrelated 
attributes lumped under a common rubric, commentators often view 
publicness as an end that the law should promote in the public interest.18 
For example, policy makers often assert that public firms may have a better 
track record of creating jobs;19 make investment opportunities available to 
a broader class of investors;20 or simply provide investors, academics, and 
other interested parties with greater insight into how the economy operates.  
                                                                                                                     
 14. See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 564 
(2013) [hereinafter Schwartz, Twlight of Equity]; see also Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, 
supra note 1, at 374 (“[The] amorphous cluster of public law within securities regulation is meant 
for those companies with a large public footprint.”). 
 15. See infra Section III.A (discussing the decisions to mount an initial public offering (IPO), 
to list securities on an exchange, and to make securities available for trading through a central 
depository).  
 16. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information 
Order of Sarbanes–Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1134 (2003); see Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. 
Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. 
FIN. ECON. 243, 264 (1998) [hereinafter Black & Gilson, Banks Versus Stock Markets]. 
 17. See Schwartz, Twilight of Equity, supra note 14, at 579 (recommending a “lifecycle 
model” of secondary market regulation that narrowly tailors regulatory obligations to the needs of 
investors as firms progress through various stages of maturity). 
 18. See Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 340 (defining “publicness” as 
“what society demands of powerful institutions, in terms of transparency, accountability, and 
openness, in order for that power to be legitimate”).  
 19. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, at 7 (2012) (asserting, as part of the justifications for the 
JOBS Act, that “[r]esearch indicates that 90% of the jobs that companies create are created after 
their IPO”).  
 20. See Rodrigues, supra note 6, at 3425, 3427–30 (surveying perspectives on the importance 
of investment access to unaccredited investors as a matter of providing opportunities for portfolio 
diversification); see also MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS 
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 28–49 (1994) (advancing the political theory that diffuse, public 
ownership of U.S. corporations was the product of “[p]opular animus against large financial 
institutions,” which led to restrictions or limitations on concentrated ownership of U.S. corporations 
by banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and other financial institutions); Gubler, supra note 
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To this end, one might envision gradations of publicness delimited by 
market norms and investor expectations. This Article proposes four such 
gradations. First, one might classify a company as publicly held if its shares 
are freely alienable. Second, a company may be classified as publicly 
traded if its shares come to be actively bought and sold in a liquid 
secondary market. Third, a company may be classified as publicly 
monitored once an issuer adopts an internal reporting and governance 
architecture and engages independent external compliance oversight. 
Finally, a company may be classified as publicly accountable if its 
operations merit heightened public scrutiny by virtue of the economic and 
social impact of its business activities. 
A.  Publicly Held 
The most basic gradation of publicness might encompass companies 
that have offered for sale to the general public debt or equity interests that 
are freely alienable without further negotiation of exit rights.21 The 
canonical example is a company that has made a “registered public 
offering” under section 5 of the Securities Act.22 A company may pursue a 
public offering for a variety of reasons, such as to access new and diverse 
sources of financing for growth, promote name recognition, provide an 
objective value for shares (and other components of managerial 
compensation), or provide founders and other early investors with an 
opportunity to exit their interest.23 The expense of preparing a registration 
statement and prospectus that complies with the requirements of the 
Securities Act24 and the underwriting fees charged in initial public 
offerings (IPOs) are, nevertheless, considerable barriers to such offerings.25  
                                                                                                                     
6, at 799–801 (discussing, in addition to the benefits of portfolio diversification, the specter of 
wealth inequality, sharpening of class differences, and undesirable “political correctives”). 
 21. As a matter of state law, such companies would be distinct from those that place 
conditions or restrictions on the transfer of securities (such as through an agreement with or among 
security holders) or those whose organizational form does not permit alienation of ownership 
interests (such as many partnerships or member-managed LLCs). 
 22. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012). 
 23. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 93–94 (2006). 
 24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 77j, 77aa. 
 25. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 92–93 (noting that going public “is costly” in part because 
firms must incur “substantial underwriting and legal fees”); Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The 
Seven Percent Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105, 1116 (2000) (discussing, among other explanations for the 
high cost of IPO underwriting clustered at a spread of around 7%, the inelastic demand for 
underwriter prestige, the cost of analyst coverage and price stabilization, and syndication); Richard 
A. Booth, The Limited Liability Company and the Search for a Bright Line Between Corporations 
and Partnerships, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 79, 92 (1997) (noting the expense of creating 
registration statements and other documents incident to going public). As will be discussed in 
Section I.B, a public offering under the Securities Act also triggers the compliance costs, periodic 
disclosure requirements, and heightened liability associated with the public trading of securities. 
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For this reason, federal securities law has provided issuers with an ever-
expanding menu of options for offering freely tradable securities to the 
public without the cost of mounting an IPO. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) Regulation A, for example, permits a tier of direct 
public offerings of up to $5 million subject to a less onerous offering 
statement and circular.26 In light of Regulation A’s limited utility, the 
JOBS Act mandated a second tier of Regulation A offerings of up to $50 
million subject to enhanced disclosure obligations.27 The SEC also permits 
offerings of up to $1 million under various exemptions, such as the 
exemption in Rule 504 geared toward offerings registered or exempt under 
state law28 and the exemption for crowdfunded offerings mandated by the 
JOBS Act.29 
As commentators have observed, however, a new trend is to use private 
placements or other “back door” transactions to place securities indirectly 
with the public to avoid the heightened disclosure requirements for direct 
offerings.30 Generally speaking, issuers may privately place securities (for 
                                                                                                                     
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)(1).  
 26. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251–.263 (2014). For a description of Regulation A, see Proposed Rule 
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 
79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 3927 (proposed Jan. 23, 2014); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The New 
Regulation of Small Business Capital Formation: The Impact―If Any―Of the JOBS Act, 102 KY. 
L.J. 815, 839–40 (2013–2014) (providing that under Regulation A, the issuer may make a public 
offering of up to $5 million, predicated on the filing of an offering statement and an offering 
circular); see also id. at 844 (noting Regulation A’s tiered offerings).  
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2) (requiring the SEC by rule or regulation to add a class of securities 
exempted under section 3(b) that may be offered in an aggregate amount not to exceed $50 million 
during a twelve-month period); see also Campbell, supra note 26, at 840–41 (noting that, in the 
wake of the “failure” of Regulation A, the JOBS Act added section 3(b) providing an exemption for 
offerings of up to $50 million); Proposed Rule Amendments, 79 Fed. Reg. at 3927.  
 28. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504; see also Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration 
Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1444 (2012) (comparing Rule 504 
and the JOBS Act’s crowdfunding exemption).  
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (requiring the SEC by rule or regulation to implement a 
crowdfunding exemption); Rules Governing the Offer and Sale of Securities Through 
Crowdfunding Under Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9470, 
78 Fed. Reg. 66427 (Nov. 5, 2013); see also Cohn, supra note 28, at 1438 (“The exemption allows 
for up to one million dollars to be raised during a twelve-month period, reduced by the amount of 
any other securities sold by the issuer during that period.”). The offering of shares through such 
arrangements poses idiosyncratic regulatory issues, particularly to the extent that investors may 
participate in crowdfunded offerings for a variety of reasons other than an expectation of profit. See 
C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 
14–27 (classifying motivations for investing in crowdfunded enterprises); Joan MacLeod 
Heminway, What Is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 
335, 358–61 (2012) (describing the “market for crowdfunding and crowdfunded interests in 
business ventures” before the JOBS Act). 
 30. See generally Thompson & Langevoort, Redrawing, supra note 7, at 1588–1604 
(describing “back door” transactions such as private investments in public equity (PIPEs) and 
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example, in reliance on Rule 506 under Regulation D)31 with certain 
categories of “accredited investors”32 as well as additional offerees who 
possess the sophistication and access to information necessary to be “able 
to fend for themselves.”33 Rule 506 placements have long enjoyed greater 
popularity than other exemptions (including exemptions for direct 
offerings) due to the opportunity for unlimited sales, no minimum 
disclosure requirements for accredited investors, and preemption of state 
law registration and qualification.34 Nevertheless, the SEC has faced 
                                                                                                                     
reverse mergers). Reverse mergers with an Exchange Act reporting company allow affiliates of an 
issuer to resell their securities immediately to the public under the cloak of the reporting company’s 
public status, id. at 1588–98, while PIPEs may allow investors in a private placement by a public 
company to resell their securities without triggering “underwriter” liability. Id. at 1598–1604. 
 31.  1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.25 (6th ed. 
2009); see also Dustin G. Hall, Note, The Elephant in the Room: Dangers of Hedge Funds in Our 
Financial Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 190 (2008).  
 32. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (defining “accredited investor” by reference to regulatory status, 
net worth, or net income). The development of criteria for “accredited investors” is critical to the 
success of these efforts. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION: ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA FOR QUALIFYING AS AN ACCREDITED INVESTOR SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED, GAO 13-640, 8–12 (July 2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/
655963.pdf [hereinafter 2013 AI Report] (relating the history of the definition of accredited 
investor). Congress and the SEC have allowed issuers to place unlimited quantities of securities 
with an unlimited number of accredited purchasers without any minimum disclosure requirement on 
the theory that accredited investors have the sophistication and leverage to negotiate for information 
or the capacity to absorb risk. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (excluding “accredited 
investors” for purposes of calculating the number of investors in Rule 505 and Rule 506 offerings); 
id. § 230.502(b)(1) note (establishing disclosure requirements for sales of securities to persons other 
than accredited investors subject to the caveat that the issuer “should consider providing such 
information to accredited investors as well, in view of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws”). 
 33. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). The SEC has implemented this 
principle through various safe harbors and exemptions. Among other factors, such relief may limit 
the number and qualifications of individuals to whom an issuer may offer or sell a security, the use 
of mass media and other forms of “general solicitation,” and the ability of successive purchasers to 
resell such securities until the issuer’s securities have “come to rest.” See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 
.502(c), .505, .506; see also Busch v. Carpenter, 827 F.2d 653, 656 (10th Cir. 1987).  
 34. Campbell, supra note 26, at 826–27 (discussing the reasons why Rule 506 is “very 
popular”). For a discussion of state law preemption, see infra text accompanying note 187. 
According to a recent series of studies by SEC staff, the amount of capital raised under Regulation 
D rivals that of both IPOs and Rule 144A offerings. VLADIMIR IVANOV & SCOTT BAUGUESS, 
CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D 
EXEMPTION, 2009–2012, at 8–9 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/
whitepapers/dera-unregistered-offerings-reg-d.pdf. Moreover, 99% of capital raised under 
Regulation D was raised under Rule 506, even though (1) 50% of Rule 506 offerings were for $1 
million or less and (2) an additional 20% of such offerings were for $5 million or less, therefore 
qualifying for less restrictive offering rules under Rules 504 and 505. Id. at 7, 11; see also Proposed 
Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities 
Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 3967–71 (proposed Jan. 23, 2014) (proposing preemption of state 
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significant pressure to liberalize resales of such “restricted securities” to 
reduce the economic risk of participating in private placements. Today, 
initial investors may resell such securities after a relatively short holding 
period with few restrictions on the manner of offering or the extent of 
public diffusion.35  
More recent deregulatory efforts may facilitate public diffusion of such 
privately placed securities more rapidly than Congress or the SEC ever 
intended. As required by the JOBS Act,36 the SEC eliminated the 
prohibition against the use of the Internet and other mass media to solicit 
accredited investors in Rule 506 private placements.37 Although Rule 506 
requires issuers to take “reasonable steps” to verify the status of 
purchasers,38 the shift from regulating offerings to verifying purchasers 
allows issuers to raise the public profile of their private capital-raising 
                                                                                                                     
securities law registration and qualification requirements for “Tier 2” Regulation A offerings of up 
to $50 million); Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad) 
Outcomes for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BUS. LAW. 919, 940 (2011) (criticizing the 
SEC’s failure to liberalize Rules 504 and 505). 
 35. The resale of privately placed securities by affiliates or nonaffiliates of the issuer to the 
public may constitute a “distribution” that exposes both the issuer and selling security holders as 
“underwriters” to liability for noncompliance with the registration requirement of the Securities Act. 
See 1 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 566–76 (6th ed. 2011) 
(describing interpretation of section 4(a)(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1) (2012)). The SEC 
adopted Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144, as a safe harbor for resales of such “restricted” securities 
based on factors that courts had developed to distinguish issuer “distributions” from routine 
“trading” transactions, including the investor’s holding period, the information available about the 
issuer, the amount of securities resold, the character of the selling effort, and the availability of 
public information about the issuer. See id. § 230.144(c)–(g); Definition of Terms “Underwriter” 
and “Brokers’ Transactions,” 37 Fed. Reg. 591, 592 (Jan. 14, 1972) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.144); 1 LOSS ET AL., supra, at 566–81 (describing private resales under section 4(1) of the 
Securities Act prior to Rule 144). Over the past two decades, the SEC has progressively reduced the 
holding period for restricted securities and has substantially eliminated restrictions on the amount 
and manner of resale for persons other than affiliates of the issuer. See Revisions to Rules 144 and 
145, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,546, 71,546 (Dec. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239); 
Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145, 62 Fed. Reg. 9242, 9242 (Feb. 28, 
1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230). 
 36. See Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 37. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in 
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,796 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242). 
 38. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c). The ability to rely on a third-party certification from a broker–
dealer (among other professionals) presents an opportunity for the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA) to play a greater oversight role in private placements—similar to broker–dealers 
using their “preexisting relationships” with customers to place securities in compliance with the 
prohibition against “general solicitation.” See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: Will FINRA 
Sink in the Sea Change?, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 465, 479–88 (2013); see also infra Subsection II.A.2.ii 
(discussing FINRA’s “suitability rule”). 
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transactions.39 In light of the limited holding period for resales of privately 
placed securities under the SEC’s Rule 144 safe harbor, one may 
effectively prime the secondary retail market simultaneously with a high-
profile private placement—a potential Facebook, for instance—thereby 
creating a “[d]eregulatory securities nirvana.”40 
B.  Publicly Traded 
The mere fact that securities may be freely alienated does not guarantee 
a secondary market populated with prospective buyers and sellers. Such a 
vibrant secondary market may be of critical importance to an issuer that 
wishes to raise money (or compensate its executives and employees) 
through the issuance of additional shares in subsequent transactions. The 
second gradation of publicness might therefore include issuers of securities 
traded in a secondary market that provides investors with a reasonable 
expectation of liquidity.41 The degree of liquidity a firm enjoys depends not 
only on quantitative factors, such as the size and diffusion of the issuer’s 
capital stock, but also on the participation of intermediaries, such as 
broker–dealers and market makers, to facilitate investment in and trading 
of its shares.42  
Issuers who seek to foster a secondary market for their securities must 
generally provide sufficient ongoing information to allow prospective 
buyers, sellers, and market intermediaries to negotiate prices reasonably 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 40. Panel Discussion, Deregulating the Markets: The JOBS Act, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 476, 491 
(2013) (statement of Professor Robert Thompson). Business considerations may prevent a full-
blown indirect public resale market. Issuers may refuse to eliminate contractual restrictions or stop-
transfer instructions to prevent the resale of securities otherwise eligible for immediate sale to avoid 
dealing with new configurations of shareholders. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 44. Venture 
Capitalists (VCs) may wish contractually to lock founders in as well. See Jose M. Mendoza & Erik 
P.M. Vermeulen, The “New” Venture Capital Cycle (Part I): The Importance of Private Secondary 
Market Liquidity 24 (Lex Research Topics in Corp. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 1, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1829835 (explaining that founders 
may lose motivation to contribute to the corporation when they can start selling their shares, so 
firms may want to use restrictions in their “by-laws, investment term sheets or employment 
contracts” to prevent founders from selling their shares). 
 41. State corporation laws may treat securities as increasingly passive investments as the 
number of holders increases. For example, many states limit appraisal rights when there is an 
adequate opportunity to sell shares into the market. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) 
(West 2013) (creating a market-out exception from the appraisal statute for firms whose shares are 
held of record by more than 2,000 holders); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(b)(1)(ii) 
(2002) (same). The Model Business Corporation Act further defines the oversight responsibilities of 
directors of public companies in light of the separation of ownership from management. Id. § 8.01 
& cmt. (setting forth and discussing the “oversight responsibilities” of directors of public 
companies). 
 42. See generally LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES 394–409 (2003) (defining 
“liquidity and its various dimensions,” and identifying the “types of traders who supply liquidity” 
and discussing “how they compete with each other”). 
11
Dombalagian: Principles for Publicness
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
660 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
related to a market equilibrium. The gold standard is the reporting regime 
established under section 13 of the Exchange Act.43 The Exchange Act 
imposes reporting requirements on companies that have a class of 
securities listed on a national securities exchange,44 meet the Act’s 
shareholder numerosity and asset thresholds,45 or undertake to become 
reporting companies when making a public offering.46 As will be discussed 
in Section I.C, Exchange Act reporting subjects public companies to many 
additional monitoring obligations as well. 
Issuers may also commit to disclosures comparable to the Exchange Act 
even when they are not otherwise subject to the Act’s reporting regime.47 
Holders of publicly traded debt might require an issuer to commit to 
periodic reporting beyond the Exchange Act’s requirements,48 and 
qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) might require comparable compliance 
to sustain secondary trading under the QIB Rule.49 As trading in 
institutional and public debt markets has become increasingly 
transparent,50 exchanges and investment banks have renewed efforts to 
                                                                                                                     
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2012). The Exchange Act requires reporting companies to make 
annual, quarterly, and episodic filings with the SEC regarding their financial condition, business 
and operations, and management and corporate governance. 1 LOSS ET AL., supra note 35, at 670–88 
(summarizing the reporting requirements).  
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)–(b).  
 45. Id. § 78l(g)(1)(A) (raising the numerosity threshold for equity shareholders from 500 
shareholders to either 2000 persons or 500 persons who are not accredited investors); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.12g-1 (2014) (raising asset threshold from $1 million to $10 million); see 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.12g5-1 (providing rules for counting legal entities, such as corporations, for numerosity 
purposes); see also infra note 56 (critiquing counting of shareholders under section 12(g)). The 
JOBS Act requires the SEC to exempt crowdfunded offerings from section 12(g). 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78l(g)(6). 
 46. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d). 
 47. See infra note 129–130. 
 48. An issuer’s obligation to publish Exchange Act reports with respect to a publicly offered 
class of securities, such as a class of unlisted debt securities, is “automatically suspended as to any 
fiscal year” after the first fiscal year in which the securities of the class are “held of record by less 
than 300 persons.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).  
 49. Rule 144A permits unlimited resales of certain privately placed securities among QIBs 
subject to minimum disclosure requirements with a view to facilitating immediate trading of 
corporate debt and other securities in segregated institutional markets. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A 
(Rule 144A or the QIB Rule). 
 50. FINRA requires real-time reporting of corporate debt transactions. FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH. MANUAL R. 6200 et seq. (2014), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4412 (last visited Mar. 14, 2015) [hereinafter 
FINRA MANUAL]; see, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority, Inc.; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Dissemination of 
Transactions in TRACE-Eligible Securities that are Effected Pursuant to Securities Act Rule 144A, 
Exchange Act Release No. 70,009, 106 SEC Docket 15 (July 19, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/finra/2013/34-70009.pdf (setting forth FINRA’s proposal for greater 
post-trade transparency in Rule 144A transactions).  
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establish trading platforms that provide liquidity among QIBs;51 ongoing 
reporting is a necessary complement to such efforts. Moreover, while 
offerings of equity securities under Rule 144A remain rare,52 public or 
privately placed debt securities that are convertible or exchangeable into 
publicly tradable equity securities may create additional incentive for 
issuers to develop or maintain Exchange Act disclosure controls.53 
Not all trading in secondary markets relies on the availability of 
Exchange Act reports.54 Securities sold in smaller public or private equity 
offerings but that do not enjoy deep trading interest may rely 
predominantly on individual market makers in “over-the-counter” 
markets.55 Individual dealers acting as over-the-counter market makers 
may hold themselves out as willing to buy and sell securities of an issuer 
with or without the issuer’s consent.56 Market makers and broker–dealers 
                                                                                                                     
 51. 1 EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND 
DERIVATIVES MARKETS § 5.05 (11th ed. 2014) (describing unsuccessful attempts to develop 
organized markets or trading systems for Rule 144A securities); see Peter Lattman, Private 
Goldman Exchange Officially Closes for Business, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2012, 5:09 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/private-goldman-exchange-officially-closes-for-business/ 
(describing the demise of the Goldman Sachs Tradable Unregistered Equity (GSTrUE) platform due 
to a lack of liquidity); see also HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 3A SEC. & FED. CORP. 
LAW § 4:12 (2d ed.) (describing PORTAL Alliance as “an open, industry-wide platform to facilitate 
over the counter trading of 144A equity securities” co-sponsored by NASDAQ OMX Group and 
various investment and commercial banks). 
 52. See CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE 
SECURITIES LAWS § 7.09[A][2] (4th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
 53. 1 GREENE ET AL., supra note 51, § 7.08[3] (describing Rule 144A convertible and 
exchangeable securities); JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 52, § 7.09[A] (same); see also infra 
note 129. 
 54. Because the Exchange Act reporting obligation terminates once the number of holders of 
record of a class of unlisted securities is reduced to less than 300 persons, issuers may take steps—
some questionable—to exit Exchange Act reporting. See Jesse M. Fried, Firms Gone Dark, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 135, 140–43 (2009) (describing how firms might use reverse stock splits or self-tender 
offers to withdraw from Exchange Act reporting requirements); Langevoort & Thompson, 
Publicness, supra note 1, at 357 (suggesting that issuers might use the divergence of record and 
beneficial ownership to withdraw from Exchange Act reporting requirements under section 12(g)). 
But see 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1(b)(3) (“If the issuer knows or has reason to know that the form of 
holding securities of record is used primarily to circumvent the provisions of section 12(g) or 15(d) 
of the Act, the beneficial owners of such securities shall be deemed to be the record owners 
thereof.”). 
 55. These may include securities listed and traded on platforms such as the Over-the-Counter 
Bulletin Board (OTC BB) and OTC Markets. See infra note 222.  
 56. Exchange Act 12g3-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (2014), generally exempts foreign 
private issuers that are not listed in the United States from Exchange Act reporting, although 
involuntary trading of their shares can nevertheless subject them to increased compliance costs in 
the United States. See Peter Iliev et al., Uninvited U.S. Investors? Economic Consequences of 
Involuntary Cross-Listings, 52 J. ACCT. RES. 473, 480–85 (2014) (noting that “[u]nsponsored OTC 
cross-listings can impose several costs on foreign firms, including increased exposure to U.S. legal 
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quoting prices for such securities must nevertheless ensure the availability 
of a minimum quantum of information about the issuer,57 though the risk 
of price inefficiency, manipulation, and insider trading increases as trading 
interest and the degree of issuer disclosure decreases.58  
In recent years, prospective purchasers of securities in traditional 
private placements have likewise looked to electronic trading venues for 
liquidity. Trading venues such as SecondMarket and SharesPost typically 
operate as traditional agency markets.59 These venues provide only limited 
information to prospective purchasers60 and often give issuers significant 
control over who can buy and sell shares, the volume of transactions, and 
price-setting mechanisms.61 As a result, the participants in these electronic 
trading venues generally have independent access to (or leverage to obtain) 
information from the issuer without the need for mandatory disclosure.62 In 
                                                                                                                     
and regulatory enforcements, risk of future exchange act registration, adverse treatment of U.S. 
security holders, and increased difficulty in establishing a future sponsored ADR program”).  
 57. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11. Compare FINRA MANUAL, supra note 50, R. 6530 
(requiring OTC BB issuers to comply with Exchange Act reporting requirements) with id. R. 6432 
(requiring members to comply with SEC Rule 15c2-11 to quote nonexchange-listed securities in 
any quotation medium). Rules 144 and 144A similarly impose minimum information requirements 
for resales of “restricted” securities. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (requiring public availability of 
information regarding the issuer by reference to Rule 15c2-11); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d). The SEC 
has also proposed semiannual and current reporting requirements for “Tier 2” Regulation A 
companies. Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 
3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 3959–61 (proposed Jan. 23, 2014).  
 58. Pollman, supra note 6, at 205–20. As will be discussed in more detail below, U.S. 
companies may occasionally seek to list on foreign securities markets, such as alternative tiers 
catering to small to medium-sized companies, to take advantage of laxer disclosure requirements. 
See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50 B.C. 
L. REV. 639, 659 (2009) [hereinafter Sjostrom, Carving a New Path]. 
 59. Much of the interest in and publicity surrounding SharesPost and SecondMarket was 
attributable to pre-public trading interest in Facebook. See Sam Mamudi, Nasdaq CEO Sees SEC 
Approval for Private Market, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2014, 4:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
02-05/nasdaq-ceo-sees-winning-sec-approval-for-private-market.html. Nevertheless, NASDAQ has 
continued with plans to launch the NASDAQ Private Market to enter this marketplace. See 
NASDAQ OMX and SharesPost to Form Private Market, NASDAQ (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://ir.nasdaqomx.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=745594.  
 60. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 6, at 209–10 (discussing the potentially limited value of 
reports coming from SharesPost). Some electronic trading venues may seek to aggregate publicly 
available information for the benefit of their participants as a means of quelling concerns about the 
lack of sufficient information or the accuracy of their valuation. See Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra 
note 40, 19–20 (describing SharesPost’s Venture-Backed Index and the additional informational 
services provided with respect to its component securities). 
 61.  Memorandum from Annemarie Tierney, General Counsel, SecondMarket 2, 5 (Sept. 12, 
2011), available at https://www.secondmarket.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Memo-on-
SecondMarkets-Legal-Framework-SecondMarket.pdf. 
 62. Sellers in such markets have consisted largely of founders, employees, and early 
investors. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 16–18; Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 17 
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raising the Exchange Act’s reporting threshold with respect to accredited 
investors and eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation for 
certain Regulation D offerings, the JOBS Act has signaled a willingness to 
promote secondary trading in these systems.63 
C.  Publicly Monitored 
A third gradation of publicness might encompass those firms whose 
demand for liquidity requires greater accountability to a larger financial 
community, including analysts, market makers, investment and 
commercial banks, and brokers.64 Internal and external monitors provide 
assurances as to the accuracy of historical information and the good faith 
basis for forward-looking information: analysts, market makers, and 
professional traders transform such information into prices, price targets, 
or trading interest, while banks and broker–dealers rely on such prices for 
purposes of extending credit against securities collateral and managing 
their trading inventory and financial exposure.65 In response to Enron-era 
                                                                                                                     
(describing the composition of sellers in SecondMarket). Buyers have included venture capital 
firms, private equity funds, and other institutional and accredited investors. See Ibrahim, supra note 
12, at 19–20; Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 18 (describing the composition of buyers in 
SecondMarket). These buyers might also simultaneously purchase securities in such markets 
alongside direct purchases from an issuer or otherwise negotiate for direct access to information 
from an issuer. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 19–20. 
 63. See JOBS Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Legislative 
Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job Creation: Hearing Before the 
H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises, 112th Cong. 35–36 (2011) 
(statement of Barry E. Silbert, Founder and CEO, SecondMarket), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/112-63.pdf (highlighting the 500-shareholder 
reporting threshold and the prohibition against general solicitation as “regulatory hurdles” that 
restricted the ability of start-ups to remain private). 
 64. This notion of public monitoring to a certain extent relates to the need for accurate pricing 
of securities, particularly in response to new information such as earnings estimates, business 
projections, and contingencies. Studies of the “mechanisms of market efficiency” focus on the 
variety of mechanisms and degree of costs incurred in acquiring, processing, and validating 
information. Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 549, 594–609 (1984) (observing that the cost of acquiring, processing, and validating 
information turns on factors such as the initial distribution of information, the size and organization 
of the marketplace, and the incentives of the analysts, market makers, exchanges, and other 
intermediaries that sustain it). 
 65. See, e.g., Michael P. Jamroz, The Net Capital Rule, 47 BUS. LAW. 863, 867 (1992) 
(describing how the real-time calculation of broker–dealer net capital under the SEC’s Net Capital 
Rule relies on the market prices of its securities and commodities positions); NYSE RULE 431 
(margin rule for NYSE members); see infra note 184 (discussing the Federal Reserve Board’s 
margin rules for broker–dealers and banks). Institutions that extend securities credit are arguably 
among the most sensitive to disruptions in price continuity to the extent that the value of their 
collateral is pegged to market prices. See, e.g., Securities Credit Transactions, 61 Fed. Reg. 20,399, 
20,402 (proposed May 6, 1996) (seeking comment as to whether the SEC’s “ready market” criteria 
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accounting scandals, Sarbanes–Oxley requires all Exchange Act reporting 
companies to establish and maintain internal controls over financial 
reporting and disclosure and to obtain an attestation on management’s 
internal control assessment from its external auditor.66 
Higher levels of public monitoring may also follow from the voluntary 
decision to list on a stock exchange (and the attendant market making and 
analyst exposure that follows). To be eligible for listing on an exchange, 
issuers must typically meet certain quantitative thresholds that build on 
Exchange Act metrics.67 Moreover, stock exchanges may apply additional 
disclosure obligations through their listing standards to ensure real-time 
price discovery and price continuity68 as well as corporate governance 
criteria aimed at “maintaining appropriate standards of corporate 
responsibility, integrity and accountability to shareholders.”69 
Federal securities law has long viewed an issuer’s voluntary decision to 
seek an exchange listing as sufficient justification to impose additional 
disclosure and governance rules.70 Building upon existing exchange 
                                                                                                                     
are sufficient to warrant permitting extensions of credit against over-the-counter equity securities by 
broker–dealers). 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012). 
 67. These include total market capitalization, number of shareholders, before-tax earnings 
from operations, cash flows, and revenues. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH. LISTED CO. MANUAL 
§ 102.01 (2012) [hereinafter NYSE MANUAL]; NASDAQ STOCK MKT. R. 5315(e), (f) (NASDAQ 
Global Select Market), 5405(a), (b) (NASDAQ Global Market), and 5505(a), (b) (NASDAQ 
Capital Market). 
 68. See, e.g., NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67, § 201.00 (emphasizing the need for continuous 
and timely disclosure of information “that may affect security values or influence investment 
decisions” or that is necessary to enable the exchange “to efficiently perform its function of 
maintaining an orderly market for the company’s securities”). In addition to timely disclosure of 
material news, such standards might include greater sensitivity with respect to the handling of 
confidential corporate matters; fair disclosure of information to analysts and institutional investors; 
prompt confirmation, denial, or clarification of rumors; or other steps to address unusual market 
activity and procedures for the public release of information through trading halts or otherwise. See, 
e.g., id. § 202.01–.06. The SEC’s Regulation FD and related interpretations provide further 
guidance to public companies on their public obligations. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–.103 (2014); 
Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Exchange Act Release No. 58288, 73 
Fed. Reg. 45,862, 45,867–68 (Aug. 7, 2008); Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Netflix, Inc., and Reed Hastings, Exchange Act Release No. 
69,279 (April 2, 2013). 
 69. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67, § 301.00. 
 70. National securities exchanges developed many of the innovations of corporate governance 
relating to board composition and audit requirements in the United States for their top-tiered 
companies at the urging of the SEC. See Audit Committee Disclosure, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,648, 
55,649–51 (Oct. 14, 1999) (summarizing the history of interplay of SEC and SRO rules in 
promoting the independence and accountability of audit committees); SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 
547–51; infra note 179. 
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standards,71 Sarbanes–Oxley requires listed companies to establish an audit 
committee composed entirely of independent directors with responsibility 
for the “appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any 
registered public accounting firm employed by that issuer.”72 Dodd–Frank 
similarly requires listed companies to establish compensation committees 
with similar qualifications and powers.73 State corporation law has not 
been immune to these trends, particularly in the context of monitoring 
high-profile transactions and business combinations.74 
Federal securities litigation serves as another external monitoring tool 
for publicly traded issuers in an efficient market. Despite criticism from 
commentators and second-guessing by courts, the “fraud on the market” 
theory articulated in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson75 remains the touchstone for 
securities class action litigation.76 Accordingly, courts use relative price 
efficiency and the existence of mechanisms for acquiring, verifying, and 
digesting new information as the evidentiary filter for determining whether 
a court will presume reliance on the integrity of market prices.77 Several 
                                                                                                                     
 71. See infra Subsection III.B.1 (discussing in greater detail the creeping federalization of 
exchange rules). 
 72. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (2014). To maintain their 
independence, the members of such committees must meet certain criteria of financial independence 
and the committees must enjoy plenary authority and adequate corporate resources to carry out their 
responsibilities. For example, members of the committee must be directors who are not affiliated 
with the issuer and do not “accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the 
issuer.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A)–(B); see also NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67, § 303A.01 
(requiring listed companies to “have a majority of independent directors” as defined in NYSE 
Rules). 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27(e)(3) (2014) (setting forth qualifications 
for “outside directors” for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code’s deduction for incentive-based 
compensation determined by a compensation committee composed of such directors); NYSE 
MANUAL, supra note 67, §§ 303A.04, 303A.05 (requiring that nominating, corporate governance, 
and compensation committees consist entirely of independent directors). 
 74. State corporation law has increasingly recognized the desirability of delegating certain 
board functions to independent directors and committees as monitors of regulatory compliance or as 
bargaining agents for shareholders in transactions in which management’s interest may diverge from 
that of public shareholders, such as takeover bids. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent 
Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1581 (2007). Professor Jeffrey Gordon suggests that the “overriding effect” of 
this trend “is to commit the firm to a shareholder wealth-maximizing strategy as best measured by 
stock price performance” because independent directors “are less committed to management and its 
vision;” they tend to “look to outside performance signals and are less captured by the internal 
perspective, which, as stock prices become more informative, becomes less valuable.” Id. at 1563. 
 75. 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988). 
 76. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408–13 (2014) 
(declining to reconsider the “fraud on the market” presumption). 
 77. Many courts apply the factors of market efficiency described in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. 
Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989), appeal dismissed, 993 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1993), to determine 
whether to certify a securities class action. These factors include:  
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SEC initiatives, such as integrated disclosure and shelf registration, have 
invoked efficiency as justification for conferring regulatory privileges as 
well.78 
D.  Publicly Accountable 
A final gradation of publicness might encompass “large, economically 
powerful business institutions” whose business activities compel the 
highest degree of public accountability.79 Large, multinational firms may 
maintain such extensive relationships with suppliers, vendors, employees, 
customers, creditors, financial counterparties, and other constituencies that 
their corporate decision-making reverberates throughout the national and 
international economy. By and large, most economic and social regulation 
of such companies takes place through bodies of law such as antitrust, 
bankruptcy, tax, labor, and civil rights laws. Proponents of corporate social 
responsibility nevertheless view the mandatory disclosure mechanisms of 
federal securities law as a tool for communicating information to the 
investing community and the broader public when voluntary disclosures 
fail.80 
                                                                                                                     
(1) the stock’s average trading volume; (2) the number of securities analysts that 
followed and reported on the stock; (3) the presence of market makers and 
arbitrageurs; (4) the company’s eligibility to file a Form S-3 Registration 
Statement; and (5) a cause-and-effect relationship, over time, between unexpected 
corporate events or financial releases and an immediate response in stock price. 
In re Xcelera.com Secs. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 511 (1st Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted) (citing 
Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–87). Evidence of market inefficiency that courts may consider at the 
certification stage might include impediments to short selling, violations of put-call parity, and 
serial correlation of prices. See, e.g., In re Polymedica Corp. Secs. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 
273–79 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 78. The SEC has taken steps to reduce the compliance costs of disclosure for highly-
capitalized and well-known seasoned firms on the assumption that their securities trade in an 
efficient market. See, e.g., Revisions to the Eligibility Requirements for Primary Securities 
Offerings on Forms S-3 and F-3, 72 Fed. Reg. 73,534, 73,536 (Dec. 27, 2007) (reaffirming that the 
“system of integrated disclosure has, since its inception, been premised on the idea that a company’s 
disclosure in its registration statement can be streamlined to the extent that the market has already 
taken that information into account”); see also Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient 
Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 136–44 (1984) 
(describing the relationship between integrated disclosure and shelf registration). 
 79. Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 340. 
 80. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate 
Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 942–44 (2013) (discussing the divergence of “the interests 
of directors and executives . . . from those of shareholders,” the “expressive significance for 
shareholders beyond the direct financial effects,” and justifications for disclosure of political 
spending); Galit A. Sarfaty, Human Rights Meets Securities Regulation, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 97, 115, 
125 (2013) (arguing that securities disclosure can promote international regulatory convergence 
around social and, particularly, human rights); David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting 
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At the federal level, advocates of socially responsible corporate 
decision-making have pressed for the use of federal securities disclosure to 
establish norms of conduct in areas such as bribery, environmental 
responsibility, executive compensation, campaign finance, conflict 
minerals, and consumer protection.81 As Professor Cynthia Williams has 
argued, public disclosures under federal securities law not only aim to 
improve the accuracy of financial information but also to “provide 
additional information bearing on how profits are being generated.”82 
Compelling “disclosure of considerable information about policies, 
choices, and processes” may establish an “information-forcing-substance 
regime” that ultimately forces substantive engagement with such issues.83  
Disclosure is not the only tool that advocates of corporate social 
responsibility have sought to employ. Congress, the SEC, and the listing 
exchanges have considered or adopted shareholder voting requirements on 
specific corporate governance matters, such as equity compensation plans 
and “say-on-pay” votes on executive compensation,84 in addition to greater 
disclosure about compensation practices.85 These advocates have also 
attempted to reform the process and reduce the cost of nominating 
institutional shareholder representatives to corporate boards to encourage 
proxy contests based on corporate policy.86 Shareholder initiative rules 
                                                                                                                     
as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 440 
(2005) (arguing that “environmental performance information” is a “public good” that companies 
will underproduce and understandardize without mandatory disclosure). 
 81. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012) (requiring disclosures relating to conflict minerals 
originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo); id. § 78m(q) (requiring disclosure of 
payments by resource extraction issuers); Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 953(b)(1), 124 
Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78l note) (requiring disclosure of the 
ratio of the median annual total compensation of all employees of the issuer and the annual total 
compensation of the CEO); Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 80, at 928 (advocating SEC rule 
making following Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)). 
 82. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1999). 
 83. Sale, supra note 1, at 143. 
 84. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–21 (2014). 
 85. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2014); NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67, § 312.00. 
 86. Institutional investors have made such efforts both through lobbying for mandatory rules 
and through private ordering. Dodd–Frank authorized the SEC to “issue rules permitting the use by 
a shareholder of proxy solicitation materials supplied by an issuer of securities for the purpose of 
nominating individuals to membership on the board of directors of the issuer.” Dodd–Frank Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S. Code). The SEC adopted such a requirement shortly thereafter. Facilitating Shareholder 
Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (adopting Rule 14a-11). Nevertheless, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated Rule 14a-11 as “arbitrary and capricious” 
due to the SEC’s failure “adequately to assess the economic effects of the new rule.” Bus. 
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Not coincidentally, Delaware 
contemporaneously amended its general corporation law to permit the adoption of bylaws that 
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likewise give both institutional and retail activists a tool for lobbying for or 
against particular business practices.87 
II.  MANAGING TRANSITIONS TO PUBLICNESS 
U.S. federal securities law does not hold out a unitary concept of 
publicness, nor does it necessarily mandate a single path to becoming 
public. Some firms resist becoming publicly held or traded as long as they 
are able to secure private financing and restrict ownership or resale of their 
securities. Other companies contemplate a public offering on a specific 
timetable with a view toward providing exit opportunities for founders and 
investors, but they may elect not to pursue an exchange listing to avoid the 
higher levels of visibility, transparency, and accountability that such 
commitment entails. Yet others may oscillate between higher and lower 
states of transparency as the costs of public exposure wax and wane in 
relation to the benefits of access to capital markets.  
Regardless of how companies make the transition, each aspect of 
publicness discussed in Part I transforms the relationship between a 
company and its investors, capital markets, and society—often abruptly 
and at substantial short-term cost to the issuer. This Part considers three of 
the critical transitions that regulation and market norms must address on 
the road to higher orders of publicness: (1) the shift from control to 
liquidity; (2) the shift from negotiated to standardized disclosure; and (3) 
the gradual internalization of negative externalities. As the number of 
holders of, or the volume of transactions in, a class of equity securities 
increases, those equity holders simultaneously lose control and gain 
liquidity. Standardized disclosures and external research come to replace 
negotiated access to information and individualized due diligence. As the 
issuer’s social footprint grows, policy makers look to the issuer to 
minimize the spillover effects of its financial reporting, corporate 
governance, and business operations. 
A.  The Exit Gap: From Control to Liquidity 
The most critical transition a company undergoes is the shift in leverage 
between managers and investors as public investors increasingly hold and 
                                                                                                                     
provide comparable access to proxy materials. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2009); see also Fisch, 
supra note 5, at 769 (commenting on continuing efforts to obtain shareholder proxy access through 
“private ordering” under Delaware law); Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and Its 
Political Economy, in Delaware and in Washington, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 36 (2012) 
(characterizing Delaware’s decision to amend its corporation law to allow shareholders access to the 
company’s proxy solicitation materials as “giv[ing] enough of what the relevant federal players 
want so that . . . the federal authorities will refrain from seeking more and will instead turn their 
attention elsewhere”). 
 87. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2014). 
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trade the company’s shares. Sophisticated creditors and investors may wish 
to share control (or at least have the option to assert control) over a nascent 
enterprise and its founders in light of significant uncertainty as to how to 
maximize value at the outset of a relationship.88 Consequently, the 
managers of an enterprise that seeks to raise more than trivial amounts of 
capital must decide how much autonomy they are willing to cede to attract 
sophisticated investors.89 As a company’s equity base grows, the dilemma 
abates: the availability of liquidity reduces the need for sophisticated 
investors to participate in control because they have an exit option.90 
Shepherding this transition raises two questions of regulatory policy. 
First, to what extent should regulators deliberately restrict (or refuse to 
expand) the exit options of sophisticated investors? On the one hand, 
constraining exit options means that fewer ventures will get off the 
ground.91 On the other hand, if venture capitalists (VCs) and institutions 
play a vital quality assurance role in vetting pre-public companies,92 
constraining their entry and exit options might induce them to be more 
selective in making investment decisions and negotiating for a greater role 
in governance when they elect to invest.93 This, in turn, might help ensure 
that firms that go public through this route are better managed and better 
suited to public trading. 
Second, to what extent should federal securities law protect 
unsophisticated investors from opportunistic behavior as the offering 
options for issuers increase and the exit options for sophisticated investors 
expand? Participants in the secondary private market have traditionally 
                                                                                                                     
 88. Shared control may take a number of forms, including staged financing, seats on the 
board, the right to remove the founders from management, and covenants against certain 
opportunistic behavior. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 90–92; see also William W. Bratton, Venture 
Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 893–94 
(2002) (discussing investors’ relative preference for shared and absolute control in the face of 
uncertainty and noncontractability). 
 89. Crowdfunded or other microcap offerings may not require such trade-offs, to the extent 
that investors in such offerings may not be inclined to impose such discipline on issuers. See supra 
note 29. 
 90. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 172 (discussing the long-standing trade-off between 
liquidity and accountability for both entrepreneurs and institutional investors). 
 91. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 2 (noting that “the success of venture capital depends on 
the ability of venture capitalists . . . to exit their investments”). 
 92. See Black & Gilson, Banks Versus Stock Markets, supra note 16, at 272–74 (discussing 
the superiority of the IPO as the exit strategy for venture capital in the United States and the 
corresponding influence that this strategy has had on the incentives and governance of VC firms). 
 93. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 30–32 (describing such concerns but downplaying the 
extent to which a secondary market for VC firms would eliminate incentives for disciplined 
investment). 
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avoided retail markets for a variety of reasons.94 As a result, such resales 
have not caused regulators to demand heightened information production 
and sales practice requirements comparable to the initial public offering.95 
As policy makers liberalize secondary market trading as an alternative 
pathway to publicness, however, regulators must consider whether to take 
additional steps to protect unsophisticated investors.96 
1.  Facilitating Resales  
The first of these two questions—regarding exit options for 
sophisticated investors—has generated significant commentary in recent 
years. Within the U.S. capital markets system, the IPO remains a vital exit 
route for VCs and entrepreneurs.97 From the perspective of a company’s 
founders, an IPO is likely to yield the greatest autonomy; from the 
perspective of the VCs, an IPO may often yield the highest return in light 
of the limited number of potential purchasers with whom to negotiate a 
private sale.98 Nevertheless, a VC may negotiate additional exit options 
                                                                                                                     
 94. See Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 22–25. In addition to triggering the 
Exchange Act’s numerosity threshold, public secondary trading could subject the issuer and its 
owners to double taxation. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 43 (discussing the impact of classification 
as a ‘“publicly traded partnership[]”’ under the Internal Revenue Code). 
 95. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, supra note 40, at 491 (“[W]hen your sellers get ready to resell 
their shares, because you’re under 2,000 and because you haven’t registered on a stock exchange 
and listed on a stock exchange and you haven’t done IPO, the resale occurs without any periodic 
10-K, 10-Q disclosure for the resale market.”); cf. Pollman, supra note 6, at 205–06 (noting the 
debate between regulators over how much restraint is necessary to control secondary markets). 
 96. See Thompson & Langevoort, Redrawing, supra note 7, at 1624–27 (discussing the role 
of sales practice regulation as a substitute for the Securities Act regime). 
 97. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: 
Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 865, 883 
(1997); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 356 n.136 
(2005). 
 98. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Does Venture Capital Require an Active 
Stock Market?, 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 36, 42 (1999) [hereinafter Black & Gilson, Active Stock 
Market] (describing the potential exit through an IPO as part of an “implicit contract” over control 
between VCs and entrepreneurs to encourage high performance). Commentators generally perceive 
other options, such as trade sales or put rights, as inferior. See, e.g., Pierre Giot & Armin 
Schwienbacher, IPOs, Trade Sales and Liquidations: Modelling Venture Capital Exits Using 
Survival Analysis 1–2 (unpublished manuscript) (Mar. 14, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=461840. Trade sales create potential for 
opportunistic behavior insofar as senior investors may have an incentive to cash out earlier and at a 
lower valuation, whereas junior shareholders and founders have an incentive to hold out for higher 
valuations. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in 
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 994–97 (2006). But see Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 28–29 
(suggesting that incentives might be inverted in some cases as entrepreneurs seek an early exit while 
VCs hold out to maximize return). Fiduciary remedies, voting rights, appraisal rights, and other 
legal rights may or may not be sufficient to constrain such behavior. See Fried & Ganor, supra, at 
999–1008. 
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with respect to the businesses in which it invests—such as the right to sell 
its stake to another VC, to compel a sale of the business or its assets to a 
third party, or to liquidate the firm and exercise contractual priority with 
respect to the distribution of its assets.99 
Although regulators cannot create liquidity, they have some flexibility 
to influence this dynamic by regulating or deregulating the resale of 
securities in ways other than through a registered public offering. Some 
defenders of the status quo have suggested that maintaining the IPO as the 
preferred regulatory exit option is advantageous because it forces founders 
and investors to operate the firm in a sufficiently disciplined manner to 
induce a third party (i.e., an investment bank acting as underwriter) to 
commit capital to taking the firm public.100 In their view, delinking capital 
lockup (permanence of capital) from investor lockup (permanence of 
investment) might reduce the incentive for VCs to monitor or assert control 
over the activities of an enterprise.  
However, other commentators argue that expanding exit rights for 
sophisticated investors—perhaps to include less-regulated tiers of trading 
for sophisticated investors or members of the public—may encourage 
capital formation by reducing the risk faced by VCs in committing to 
uncertain investments.101 Companies may delay an IPO to take advantage 
of the higher valuations that are possible in heady market cycles or to avoid 
lower valuations in underwhelming cycles;102 thus, market conditions may 
lengthen the time frame between initial investment and a successful IPO, 
                                                                                                                     
 99. See DAVID P. STOWELL, INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY 346–48 
(2d ed. 2013). VCs organized as private funds typically have an investment horizon limited by the 
life of the fund (e.g., five to ten years). As a result, such VCs must structure their investments to 
arrange for exit prior to the dissolution of the fund. See id. at 346–47; TIROLE, supra note 23, at 90–
92. 
 100. See Black & Gilson, Active Stock Market, supra note 98, at 43–44 (implying that the 
advantage of the IPO is the intermediation of a third-party investment bank willing to certify public 
worthiness of a firm). 
 101. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 28–29 (“When VC and entrepreneur incentives are not 
aligned, the direct market provides a solution.”). VCs may want to lockup founders as well. 
Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 23–24 (suggesting that misalignment of incentives can 
occur if founders or key employees sell a significant part of their shares and that transfer restrictions 
can help prevent this problem). Commentators nevertheless express skepticism that liberalizing 
resales—without a means for investors to interact with the issuer in the same way as first-round 
investors—creates sophisticated secondary market liquidity. See Black & Gilson, Active Stock 
Market, supra note 98, at 47–48 (explaining that companies have tried the “straightforward 
approach” of bank-centered capital markets creating stock markets and failed); see also infra note 
128 and accompanying text (discussing the composition of secondary private markets and their 
independent access to information). 
 102. See generally Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and 
Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795 (2002) (discussing the relevance of market timing). 
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despite the contractual time line for the liquidation of a private fund.103 As 
a result, the lack of alternative exit options may force VCs to avoid capital-
intensive, longer-to-maturity industries to focus on late-stage ventures or 
serial entrepreneurs104 or to bargain for greater control.105 
2.  Facilitating Purchases by Unsophisticated Investors 
If liberalization of private resales is desirable to encourage capital 
formation, one must ask whether the public offering process remains a 
necessary filter to protect unsophisticated investors. The Securities Act’s 
registration regime contemplates the broadest possible diffusion of 
securities in a single transaction to create immediate availability of 
institutional and retail liquidity.106 The decision to go public, as described 
above, has nevertheless become as much a matter of timing as a matter of 
reaching financial milestones.107 Moreover, academic commentators have 
questioned the value of the underwriting spreads, the risks of short-term 
underpricing and long-term overpricing, and the retail frenzy associated 
with the U.S. IPO process.108  
Resales among sophisticated investors, by contrast, raise fewer 
regulatory problems. As long as secondary investors have either the 
opportunity to negotiate for a voice in governance, the right to demand a 
public offering to create instant liquidity for their securities, or the ability 
to evaluate the merits of an investment in the absence of influence, 
regulators should feel no obligation to step in to balance control and 
liquidity. The challenge regulators have faced is determining whether there 
is a risk that such securities will eventually penetrate the retail market 
before a company has conducted a public offering—and if so, developing a 
strategy for restricting or filtering such transactions to protect 
unsophisticated investors.109 
                                                                                                                     
 103. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 14. 
 104. See Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 9 (noting that “VC funds tend to avoid 
risky investments in ‘capital intensive’ and ‘longer-to-maturity’ start-up companies” and that “VC 
funds have generally become more conservative and risk-averse”). 
 105. See id. at 12 (“Under the traditional VC cycle, venture capitalists bargain explicitly for 
convertible preferred stock with its attached control and information rights to protect their 
investments against the downside risk.”). 
 106. See Ritter & Welch, supra note 102, at 1798 (discussing the conventional lifecycle theory 
of IPOs). 
 107. See supra text accompanying notes 102–05; see also Langevoort & Thompson, IPOs, 
supra note 7, at 909 (noting that section 5 of the Securities Act is now a lesser restraint on the IPO 
selling process than it once was and that such deregulation “reflects a faith that [IPO] selling efforts 
are not so troubling”). 
 108. See Pritchard, supra note 1, at 1013–16; Ritter & Welch, supra note 102, at 1802–22 
(discussing explanations for short-term underpricing and long-term underperformance); Jonathan A. 
Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 48 VAND. L. 
REV. 965, 986 (1995) (criticizing underwriter behavior). 
 109. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 1, at 1019 (questioning whether “retail investors [would] 
be harmed if we eliminated IPOs” but required issuers of public offerings to be seasoned). 
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i.  Restrictions on Offers and Resales to Unaccredited Investors 
The SEC has traditionally justified restrictions on the offer and resale of 
securities as anti-evasion rules to discourage issuers from effecting 
unregistered public offerings.110 Mechanistic limitations on the resale of 
securities have arguably lost some of their luster as a strategy to check the 
emergence of secondary markets in privately placed securities. Time and 
size restrictions—such as holding periods or limitations on the amount of 
securities that can be freely resold in the wake of an unregistered 
offering111—are crude tools to slow the penetration of securities into a 
secondary market because they force initial purchasers to assume economic 
risk for a longer period of time.112  
Likewise, the prohibition against public offers in connection with 
private placements—the “general solicitation” prohibition—has provided 
some assurance that issuers would not condition the retail market, 
including a retail resale market, for their securities.113 The cost of the 
prohibition has been that it limits the flexibility of issuers to communicate 
information to otherwise eligible investors.114 The JOBS Act’s elimination 
of the prohibition in connection with offerings to accredited investors may 
nevertheless lead to the type of mass media coverage—newspaper, 
internet, and social media advertising—that ultimately draws in the retail 
                                                                                                                     
 110. See Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,546, 71,546–49 (Dec. 17, 2007) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 239) (describing the purpose of the Rule 144 safe harbor for 
resales); Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145, 62 Fed. Reg. 9242 (Feb. 
28, 1997) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230). 
 111. See 1 LOSS ET AL., supra note 35, at 576–80 (describing the history of Rule 144). 
 112. See Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,546, 71,548 (commenting on the 
reduction of the holding period for Rule 144); Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 
144 and 145, 62 Fed. Reg. 9242, 9242 (discussing the benefits of adopting shortened holding 
periods). To the extent that the Securities Act contemplates direct offerings to unaccredited 
investors, there may be little justification (except as a means of prohibiting evasion of offering 
rules) to prohibit the resale of such securities to other nonprofessional investors through holding 
periods and size restrictions. This is particularly true if professional investors can provide liquidity 
to nonprofessional investors. For example, the JOBS Act codifies a one-year holding period for 
resales to persons other than accredited investors in the wake of an unregistered crowdfunded 
offering. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(e) (2012); see also Sara Hanks, JOBS Act Crowdfunding Provisions 
Await Clarification by SEC, 17 ELEC. COMMERCE & L. REP. (BNA) 1741, 1745 (2012) (recognizing 
the resale restrictions imposed by the JOBS Act). 
 113. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2014); see Elan W. Silver, Comment, Reaching the Right 
Investors: Comparing Investor Solicitation in the Private-Placement Regimes of the United States 
and the European Union, 89 TUL. L. REV. 719, 735 (2015) (discussing the evolution of the 
prohibition against “general solicitation” in private placements). 
 114. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Peter I. Tsoflias, An Introduction to the Federalist 
Society’s Panelist Discussion Titled “Deregulating the Markets: The JOBS Act,” 38 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 453, 454 n.3, 464–65 (2013) (citing discussion by Joanne Medero, Managing Director, 
BlackRock). 
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public when a resale market develops.115 If so, then the onus shifts 
irreversibly to investor intake—ensuring that accredited investors are in 
fact accredited—and the suitability of the offered securities for 
downstream purchasers. 
In theory, the SEC could tighten resales to nonaccredited investors in 
high-end private placements while simultaneously liberalizing resales 
among accredited investors. As Professors Thompson and Langevoort 
point out, the disconnect between the Securities Act and the Exchange Act 
makes it difficult for the SEC to do so.116 Once the risk of Securities Act 
evasion has passed or the statute of limitations on associated remedies runs 
out, the Securities Act provides little authority to restrict resales on 
investor-protection grounds. Conversely, the Exchange Act’s antifraud 
provisions may favor increased diligence and disclosure by broker–dealers 
when dealing in unregistered securities in the secondary market,117 but the 
Exchange Act arguably also offers little authority to restrict resales to 
specific tiers of investors. 
ii.  Suitability 
Suitability is a complementary tool that provides additional protection 
in connection with the sale of privately placed or publicly offered securities 
to retail investors.118 Under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s 
(FINRA) suitability rule, broker–dealers generally must exercise 
“reasonable diligence” when recommending an investment transaction or 
investment strategy, which includes an obligation to ascertain information 
about both the investment itself and “the customer’s investment profile.”119 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Professor Lawrence Hamermesh and Peter Tsoflias contend that “the chances of a 
company’s general solicitation or advertisement reaching, let alone causing significant damages to, 
non-accredited investors [are] relatively low” in light of the relative shareholdings of accredited 
investors and retail investors. Id. at 472. 
 116. Thompson & Langevoort, Redrawing, supra note 7, at 1575–76. 
 117. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (listing the information and documentation that the 
SEC requires broker–dealers to possess prior to publishing, or submitting for publication, any 
quotation for a security).  
 118. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1549, 1560–61 (1989) (suggesting that suitability rules “provide an alternative solution” to the 
problem of protecting unsophisticated investors); Jeffrey J. Hass, Small Issue Public Offerings 
Conducted over the Internet: Are They “Suitable” for the Retail Investor?, 72 S. CALIF. L. REV. 67, 
128 (1998) (proposing a federal suitability standard as part of Regulation A and Regulation D). 
 119. FINRA MANUAL, supra note 50, R. 2111(a). FINRA’s suitability rule comprises three 
components: “reasonable-basis suitability, customer-specific suitability, and quantitative 
suitability.” Id. at supp. material .05. Under the first component, the broker must have “a reasonable 
basis to believe, based on reasonable diligence, that the recommendation is suitable for at 
least some investors.” Id. Customer-specific suitability requires diligence into customers’ investment 
profile, including their “age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment 
objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any 
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To the extent that JOBS Act reforms have shifted the focus from regulating 
offerings to regulating transactions with specific offerees, some 
commentators have suggested that sales practice rules, such as suitability, 
may eventually supply the infrastructure for primary transactions in 
unregistered offerings.120 A fortiori, they might play an equally significant 
role in secondary resales in the wake of such placements.  
Consider, for example, how the principles-based approach for verifying 
accredited investor status mirrors the suitability rule.121 Under Rule 506(c), 
an issuer has to consider a number of factors when determining the 
reasonableness of its effort at verification, including: the “nature of the 
purchaser”; the “type of accredited investor that the purchaser claims to 
be”; the “amount and type of information that the issuer has about the 
purchaser”; the “nature of the offering”; and the “manner in which the 
purchaser was solicited to participate in the offering.”122 Likewise, the 
crowdfunding rules suggest that Congress favors a regulatory approach that 
protects investors by imposing limitations on the amount invested in 
relation to their means.123  
Suitability-based approaches have nevertheless proven unsatisfactory 
because violations of the rules or regulatory requirements of self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs) are generally not actionable per se.124 Private rights 
                                                                                                                     
other information the customer may disclose.” Id. R. 2111(a). Quantitative suitability requires the 
broker to “have a reasonable basis for believing that a series of recommended transactions, even if 
suitable when viewed in isolation, are not excessive and unsuitable for the customer when taken 
together in light of the customer’s investment profile.” Id. at supp. material .05.  
 120. See, e.g., Thompson & Langevoort, Redrawing, supra note 7, at 1624–27 (suggesting that 
enhanced sales practice regulation might compensate for deregulation of the public offering process 
under the Securities Act). 
 121. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii) (2014). 
 122. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 
506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,776 (July 
24, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 230, 239 & 242). While private funds that routinely offer 
interests in reliance on Rule 506 may build this structure internally, there is a sense that some of this 
diligence could be professionalized through broker–dealer sales practice rules. See, e.g., IVANOV & 
BAUGUESS, supra note 34, at 16–17 (discussing the use of finders in Regulation D offerings). 
 123. Cf. Regulation D Revisions, 53 Fed. Reg. 7866–71 (Mar. 10, 1988) (eliminating 
“accredited investor” status for individuals who purchase at least $150,000 in securities if the 
amount purchased does not exceed 20% of the person’s net worth). In some ways, capping an 
individual offeree’s investment as a percentage of income or net worth improves upon Regulation 
D’s net-income and net-worth tests by regulating the amount of an investment as opposed to the 
mere act of investment. From the perspective of individual investors, such an approach would seem 
to tailor the protections of federal securities law to the ability of individual investors to absorb risk. 
 124. See, e.g., GMS Grp., LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Although 
arguably there is no right of action simply for a violation of NASD rules, violations may be 
considered relevant for purposes of § 10(b) unsuitability claims.” (citations omitted)); Jablon v. 
Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[T]here is no implied right of action for an 
NASD rule violation.”). In the securities context, the availability of mandatory arbitration of 
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of action are typically rooted either in breach of a common law duty of care 
or, in the context of securities law, in breach of an implied representation 
that broker–dealers will conduct themselves in accordance with industry 
norms.125 Reliance on the antifraud provisions of securities law thus gives 
rise to the same burdens of proof and affirmative defenses that frustrate 
private litigants in the context of affirmative misstatements or misleading 
omissions.126 Moreover, the requirement of due diligence in assessing a 
customer’s status and objectives assumes that customers are entirely 
forthcoming about their financial situation; judicial inquiry may therefore 
often focus on the customer’s actual circumstances rather than the broker–
dealer’s diligence into the security being sold. 
B.  The Transparency Gap: From Negotiated to 
Standardized Disclosure 
In addition to balancing control and exit rights, federal securities law 
naturally plays a key role in managing the flow of information to investors 
as a company transitions to increasing levels of public trading and 
monitoring. Specifically, federal securities law must bridge the gap 
between a system in which investors privately negotiate access to 
confidential information and a system in which investors enjoy the benefit 
of an efficient informational marketplace informed by periodic and 
episodic issuer disclosures and driven by external research and analysis.  
Information disclosure functions relatively well at the extremes. 
Controlling or anchor investors in privately held firms are able to negotiate 
for board seats, access to records, periodic meetings with founders, and 
other sources of information necessary for them to monitor and guide 
management.127 In addition to the considerable diligence undertaken by 
secondary purchasers of venture capital interests in private companies, the 
networks through which VCs seek to transfer such interests may exist in a 
geographically-concentrated marketplace where investors are able to meet 
face to face with entrepreneurs.128 
                                                                                                                     
disputes under the auspices of self-regulatory bodies creates further uncertainty, for good or for ill. 
See generally 2 LOSS ET AL., supra note 35, at 1795–1808 (analyzing arbitration under the SEC 
statutes).  
 125. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1271 (1995) (describing implied representations of broker–dealers that they will deal fairly with 
customers). 
 126. Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from 
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 
677–78, 681 (1996) (explaining the concept of a customer’s right to rely and noting the judicial 
imposition of a duty to read). 
 127. See TIROLE, supra note 23, at 90. 
 128. Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 34–36 (providing an example of the India 
Venture Board); see also Pollman, supra note 6, at 203 (“[T]he secondary markets make it easier 
and more efficient for buyers and sellers to identify each other and transact.”); supra note 101 and 
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At the other extreme, the discipline imposed by institutional investors 
may be able to enforce adequate disclosure in highly sophisticated 
secondary markets without regulatory intervention. For example, investors 
in debt securities may require issuers to comply with reporting 
requirements similar to those of Exchange Act reporting companies 
through standard indentures or negotiated covenants.129 Moreover, some 
firms may commit to maintain compliance with SEC internal reporting 
controls and other quality-assurance rules even after withdrawing from 
Exchange Act reporting.130 For internet companies whose valuation turns 
in significant part on the availability of user metrics, public information or 
otherwise easily verifiable information may suffice to make valuation 
determinations.131 
Federal securities law, however, has never successfully developed a set 
of disclosure, compliance, and governance rules to facilitate a measured 
transition between these two extremes. For firms that pursue an IPO and 
simultaneously pursue an exchange listing, this transition is abrupt and 
expensive;132 many private ventures therefore cannot afford to go public, 
                                                                                                                     
accompanying text (discussing limitations on private secondary markets). For example, markets 
such as SecondMarket and SharesPost have largely functioned as venues for VCs and institutional 
investors to snap up shares sold by founders or employees. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 36–37. 
Professor Darian Ibrahim asserts that participants in such secondary markets are investing in late-
stage companies that pose a reduced risk of lemons, and participants often purchase additional 
shares from the issuer directly, which permits direct bargaining for information. See id. at 17–20. 
 129. See, e.g., Revised Model Simplified Indenture, 55 BUS. LAW. 1115, 1184 (2000) (noting 
that when a company making a debt offering “is not publicly-traded or ceases to be subject to the 
reporting requirements of the Exchange Act, many indentures add a provision which requires the 
filing, with the Trustee, of the information, documents, and reports comparable to those required 
[for listed securities under the Exchange Act]”). Because section 12(g) of the Exchange Act only 
counts the number of holders of equity securities, private placements of debt securities cannot 
trigger Exchange Act reporting unless the issuer lists securities on an exchange or they are the 
subject of a public offering. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(2)(A)–(C) (2012).  
 130. Robert P. Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of 
Sarbanes–Oxley on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 10 (2009) (noting that 
“the rate at which formerly publicly traded companies have remained SEC reporting companies 
after going private has significantly increased since SOX’s enactment,” particularly because of the 
use of high-yield institutional debt). 
 131. Internet firms whose profitability is directly linked to the volume of hits or the size and 
churn of the user base may provide investors with sufficient and verifiable information to 
extrapolate values from the publicly available financial disclosures of comparable publicly traded 
firms. See Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 347 n.39. 
 132. See supra note 25 and accompany text; see also Thomas G. James, Far from the 
Maddening Crowd: Does the JOBS Act Provide Meaningful Redress to Small Investors for 
Securities Fraud in Connection with Crowdfunding Offerings?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1767, 1773 (2013) 
(“The costs associated with observing applicable securities regulations, in particular registration 
under Section 5 of the Securities Act, would likely exceed the financing available to startups 
through a public offering.”); Id. at 1773 n.47 (providing that under the registration and disclosure 
requirements of the Securities Act, offerors incur “a litany of fees for underwriters, legal counsel, 
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and smaller post-IPO companies struggle to comply with Exchange Act 
disclosures. As a result, the tendency is to assume that regulators should 
scale the costs of Exchange Act disclosures to the ability of the firm to bear 
them rather than assess whether the production costs, compliance costs, 
and litigation risk warranted by any disclosure scheme are reasonable in 
relation to anticipated (if unquantifiable) regulatory benefits.133 
While the scope of the content of disclosures is almost always a 
relevant factor, the context in which companies produce the disclosures is 
perhaps more important: namely, the ex ante compliance cost and ex post 
litigation risk associated with periodic disclosures and other public 
communications. To the extent that internal controls and other compliance 
processes entail a high fixed cost of implementation, they may have a 
disproportionate impact on smaller firms.134 Moreover, to the extent that 
their securities do not actively trade, any accuracy-enhancing benefits of 
such controls may largely be wasted. 
By the same token, however, increased litigation risk may be 
appropriate to discourage manipulative or deceptive behavior by managers 
of issuers that are bridging the transparency gap.135 To be sure, companies 
already face a heightened risk of litigation in the wake of an IPO,136 
particularly in light of the higher due diligence standard imposed by the 
Securities Act.137 However, a heightened diligence requirement for 
                                                                                                                     
electronic filings, accountants, broker–dealers, and stock exchange listings, as well as the fees owed 
to the SEC and state securities regulators”).  
 133. See Schwartz, Law and Economics, supra note 10, at 349–50. 
 134. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar et al., Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
2002: A Cross-Country Analysis, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 107, 129 (2009) (finding support for the 
hypothesis that Sarbanes–Oxley disproportionately affected smaller firms). 
 135. For a discussion of the desirability of class action remedies in light of the net social 
welfare cost of litigation that appears to reallocate wealth among shareholders holding diversified 
portfolios, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence 
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556–66 (2006). Individual shareholders may 
nevertheless receive a net benefit from the ability to sue statutory defendants and offering 
participants other than the issuer. See, e.g., Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s 
Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1127–30 (2008) (discussing the 
“circularity” critique of public and private actions against issuers and other disclosure participants); 
Merritt B. Fox, Rethinking Disclosure Liability in the Modern Era, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 903, 913–17 
(1997) (proposing an external certification regime for corporate disclosures to this end). 
 136. One study found that companies mounting an IPO from 1996 to 2000 faced a cumulative 
risk of litigation of approximately 28% within the ten years following the offering. Securities Class 
Action Filings: 2014 Mid-Year Assessment, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 26 (2014), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=8b34f0cd-79a2-497a-9821-a28939 
28506f [hereinafter Cornerstone Study]. Exchange-listed companies faced an average 2.9% risk of 
Rule 10b-5 litigation on average from 1997 to 2013. Id. at 8. 
 137. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2012); see also id. § 77m (setting the statute of limitations for actions 
under section 11 of the Securities Act at the earlier of one year after the discovery or three years 
after the security was bona fide offered to the public). 
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managers, broker–dealers, and other intermediaries may be appropriate for 
firms that do not have an extensive analyst or institutional following. Not 
only are the securities of such issuers uniquely exposed to the risks of retail 
panic and euphoria,138 but their managers may also have an incentive to 
offload shares during heady market conditions if there is no sobering 
pushback from institutional interests.139 
C.  The Spillover Gap: Internalizing Externalities 
The final transition policy makers face entails shifting the 
accountability of corporate managers away from an exclusive focus on 
shareholder value and toward capital markets and the public generally.140 
Public monitoring and accountability entails building compliance and 
disclosure mechanisms for the benefit of constituencies other than 
shareholders.141 Regulatory policy must therefore manage the imposition of 
such incremental costs on companies. Direct costs may include additional 
production and verification requirements and associated litigation risk; 
indirect costs may include loss of confidentiality and competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis private companies or smaller public companies.142 
Benefits are more difficult to quantify: regulators must consider first for 
whose benefit these additional obligations are created and for which subset 
of companies the public benefits of compliance outweigh the private costs.  
One might classify such obligations as: (i) efforts to improve the 
operation of financial markets; (ii) efforts to improve the relationship of a 
company with its stakeholders; and (iii) efforts to serve social or political 
goals unrelated to capital allocation or corporate governance. Capital-
markets externalities generally relate to the transparency, efficiency, and 
continuity of market prices. Professor Marcel Kahan argued that inaccurate 
                                                                                                                     
 138. See, e.g., Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 33–34. 
 139. See, e.g., Ritter & Welch, supra note 102, at 1799 (discussing market-timing theories of 
IPO cycles). 
 140 Cf. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999) (articulating a theory of directorial primacy based on the idea that 
“boards exist not to protect shareholders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of 
all the members of the corporate ‘team,’ including shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, 
and possibly other groups, such as creditors”). 
 141. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing 
Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes–Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 334, 341 (describing the 
regulatory framework of Sarbanes–Oxley as one of surveillance for the protection of investors: “The 
behavior of insiders is to be constantly monitored. The public corporation has become an entity 
under surveillance by gatekeepers (outside directors, lawyers, and auditors) and government.”).  
 142. Moreover, because such rules apply to all Exchange Act reporting companies 
indiscriminately, they may discourage smaller issuers from accessing public capital markets 
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stock prices not only harm existing investors but may also systematically 
discourage investment in the stock market if investors are unwilling to 
make long-term commitments or expose themselves to unnecessary market 
volatility.143 Scholars routinely debate the effectiveness of the “accuracy-
enhancing” aspect of such internal controls over financial reporting.144 
Some post-Sarbanes–Oxley studies have found little evidence that the 
Act’s reforms improved the financial performance of public companies as 
reflected in stock prices,145 while other studies suggest that institutional 
investors sufficiently value such mechanisms to negotiate for them in 
voluntary filings.146  
Similarly, advocates for corporate governance reform often speak in the 
name of improving accountability to shareholders,147 even though the 
                                                                                                                     
 143. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 
DUKE L.J. 977, 1006, 1019, 1025 (1992). Among other consequences, the withdrawal of investors 
from capital markets may impair capital allocation, liquidity, and willingness to absorb risk, see, 
e.g., id. at 1034; cause management to focus on stock price performance rather than long-term 
growth, id. at 1028–29; increase the frequency of insider trading, macroeconomic shocks, and 
changes in control resulting from abrupt changes in market price; and decrease the desirability of 
long-term corporate contracting and capital budgeting. See generally id. (discussing the panoply of 
market maladies caused by inaccurate stock prices).  
 144. Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1047, 1093–95 (1995) (questioning the value of accuracy-enhancing aspects of mandatory 
disclosure rules). To the extent that investors are most concerned about management’s expectations 
as to future prospects rather than historical information, critics suggest that the additional 
information conveyed by these mechanisms may yield to investors only marginal benefits that do 
not justify their significant compliance costs. See, e.g., id. at 1106–07. 
 145. Romano, supra note 5, at 1529 (finding that the literature in the field “indicates that the 
data do not support the view that the SOX initiatives will improve corporate governance or 
performance”). Professor Roberta Romano has observed that many of the corporate governance 
innovations introduced by Sarbanes–Oxley—such as independence requirements for boards and 
audit committees, limitations on non-audit services by external auditors, and executive 
certifications—have little or ambiguous empirical support. See id. at 1529–43. Additionally, several 
studies have attempted to evaluate the impact of new compliance and disclosure obligations on the 
efficiency and accuracy of stock prices. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE 
FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES LITIGATION 16–29 (2002) (noting that a number of scholars have 
“sought to ascertain how the SEC’s mandatory disclosure regime has fared compared with voluntary 
practices by firms” with results indicating that the “agency has added little value”). But see FRANK 
B. CROSS & ROBERT A. PRENTICE, LAW AND CORPORATE FINANCE 152–89 (2007) (surveying 
empirical studies suggesting that “restrictive securities law rules may also produce significant 
economic benefits” and that the “pure private ordering paradigm is not optimal for securities 
markets”).  
 146. Professor Robert Bartlett III’s study of high-yield debt markets suggests that issuers with 
publicly or privately traded debt may covenant to file voluntary disclosures under the Exchange Act 
relating to economic performance, even as they avoid disclosure requirements relating to qualitative 
matters or corporate governance. See Bartlett, supra note 130, at 19–20. 
 147. See, e.g., Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 
901 (discussing corporate governance reforms from the perspective of shareholder primacy). 
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interests of other constituencies often fuel their momentum.148 For 
example, executive compensation has been a primary target of the 
shareholder primacy movement.149 Measures that strengthen the link of pay 
to performance, such as more detailed disclosure and “say-on-pay” 
votes,150 might confer some benefit on public corporations even as they 
create opportunities for vocal constituencies to use such disclosures and 
voting power to achieve other ends.151 In recent years, compensation 
reform efforts have drifted more aggressively to serve other goals—such as 
promoting pay equity for employees and reducing systemic risk of financial 
institutions—with only attenuated benefits to shareholders.152 
Finally, social disclosure and corporate social responsibility reforms are 
at best “only loosely coupled with orthodox (and arguably more 
measurable) notions of investor protection.”153 These might include 
disclosures relating to environmental impact or climate change, provenance 
of materials, bribes or other illegal payments, labor practices, and similar 
matters.154 In many cases, the benefits of such legislation are not 
susceptible to any politically meaningful cost–benefit analysis because it is 
difficult to quantify either the impact of the activities at issue or the effect 
of disclosure on the extent to which firms engage in those activities.155 
Moreover, while such disclosures may benefit investors in that they 
foreshadow the likelihood of corporate liability, they arguably aim to serve 
as the catalyst, rather than bellwether, of further governmental action. 
                                                                                                                     
 148. See Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 380–81.  
 149. See Paul Rose, Shareholder Proposals in the Market for Corporate Influence, 66 FLA. L. 
REV. 2179, 2208 (2014). 
 150. Both federal securities law and exchange listing rules have mandated incrementally 
greater disclosures and shareholder participation regarding executive compensation. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78n–1 (2012) (requiring a periodic, nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation); 
NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67, § 303A.08 (requiring that shareholders be “given the opportunity to 
vote on all equity-compensation plans”).  
 151. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 8 (2004) 
(distinguishing the authors’ “completely pragmatic and consequentialist” approach to improving 
managerial accountability from “alternative critiques” of executive compensation). 
 152. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5641(b) (requiring federal financial regulators to prescribe rules 
prohibiting “any types of incentive-based payment arrangement” that “encourages inappropriate 
risks by covered financial institutions”); Pay Ratio Disclosure, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,560, 60,582–85 
(Oct. 1, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229 & 249) (weighing the possible benefits to 
shareholders as well as the public policy benefits of adopting a rule requiring each reporting 
company to disclose the ratio of the median of the “annual total compensation” of all employees 
excluding its chief executive officer to the annual total compensation of its chief executive officer).  
 153. Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 340. 
 154. See id. at 372–73; supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 155. See, e.g., Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 376 (stating that 
verification may be incomplete because “such costs can suck up all the benefits of division of labor” 
to the corporation and, if shareholders do seek information, the “result will be to overproduce some 
information at the same time that the overall amount of information may be underproduced”).  
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If the goal of such obligations is to promote investment in firms with 
good governance or socially responsible business practices,156 reliance on 
the reporting obligations of public companies poses particular problems 
because the coverage of the Exchange Act is both over- and under-
inclusive.157 Even if a representative sampling of large public companies 
would suffice to provide the markets with adequate information about the 
spillover effects of corporate activity, the SEC is not necessarily the right 
agency to oversee such disclosures. Scholars have questioned whether the 
SEC has the resources or expertise to develop criteria that impose 
disclosures not only in proportion to the materiality of the information to 
the firm’s business158 but also in proportion to the materiality of the firm’s 
activities in the economic and social mosaic.159  
III.  REGULATING THE TRANSITION  
As implied by previous discussion, two competing approaches manage 
the transition from private ordering to public regulation today. Issuer-
                                                                                                                     
 156. See, e.g., David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual 
Materiality and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-
Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 158–61 (2007) (noting that an expanding number 
of socially responsible investors “seek information about company management commitments” and 
“[c]ompared to past generations, investors today seek more and better information from companies 
about a complex range of issues”). But see Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and 
the “Responsible” Shareholder, 10 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 71 (2005) (“As much as one might 
like for investors to be more interested than they are in information about the social impact of 
corporate activities, it might be misguided to implement a costly new disclosure regime on the 
theory that their better selves would want the information.”). 
 157. Exchange Act reporting obligations are under-inclusive because private firms may engage 
in equivalent conduct with no public accountability. The omissions of nonreporting companies may 
not only impair the comprehensiveness of the reporting regime, but may exacerbate the competitive 
gap between public and private companies. Such obligations are likely to be over-inclusive in that 
the activities of smaller reporting firms may not be of a scope or scale sufficient to provide 
nonobvious, nonredundant information to policy makers. For these reasons, encouraging 
disclosures by all companies—regardless of their status under federal securities law—might be a 
preferable approach to achieve these broader policy objectives. 
 158. To a degree, the SEC has standardized environmental disclosures to this end, but 
consistent with its expertise and statutory mission, it has focused on the materiality of information 
to investors rather than the public interest. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-
808, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND 
TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 44 app. II (2004). 
 159. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Key Implications of the Dodd–Frank Act for Independent 
Regulatory Agencies, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2011) (“The broader an agency’s jurisdiction, 
the more likely it is to lack the resources or focus to address all appropriate priorities.”); Barbara 
Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global Corruption Is Not Part of 
the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093, 1117 (2012) (“The SEC has consistently, and with good 
reason, asserted that it has inadequate resources to address all the increased demands placed upon it, 
particularly by growth in the securities industry and by Dodd–Frank.”).  
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driven approaches allow issuers to elect higher or lower levels (or simply 
different categories) of regulatory scrutiny in exchange for specific public 
benefits, often from a menu prescribed by a regulator or market 
intermediary. Metrics-driven approaches instead scale the benefits and 
obligations associated with companies in various stages of publicness with 
greater uniformity based on quantifiable or observable attributes of their 
operations and activities. 
The principal advantage of issuer-driven approaches is to give issuers 
greater control over when and to what degree they become subject to or 
able to withdraw from the public gaze. This flexibility not only permits 
issuers to conduct a more finely-tuned analysis of the trade-offs created by 
the applicable regulatory framework, but it also carves out a role for self-
regulatory bodies and market intermediaries to perform a continuous cost–
benefit analysis of the attendant privileges and obligations for both issuers 
and investors. By contrast, the advantage of metrics-based approaches is 
naturally to eliminate such discretion when issuers abuse it or fail to adapt 
to public expectations or to the practices of similarly situated companies. 
Neither paradigm, of course, exclusively describes the current U.S. 
regulatory framework. Many companies exercise significant freedom over 
their public exposure today: whether to mount a public offering, whether to 
list on an exchange, and whether to go private or escape abroad.160 At the 
same time, policy makers have whittled away at the amount of discretion 
that issuers and intermediaries enjoy to calibrate regulatory trade-offs 
within the different categories of publicness—to the point that the 
relevance of such decisions in public company regulation has become 
increasingly “anachronistic.”161 As a result, while issuers retain choice, 
they lack flexibility. 
This Part explores some of the promises and pitfalls of issuer-driven 
and metrics-driven approaches. Sections III.A and III.B consider the 
benefits and disadvantages of the issuer-driven paradigm in U.S. federal 
securities regulation, while Section III.C focuses on the difficulties posed 




                                                                                                                     
 160. See William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes–Oxley: The Irony of 
“Going Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 149–51 (2006) (highlighting the cost–benefit analysis that 
may lead to going private transactions); id. at 152–54 (contrasting alternatives, such as the decision 
to go private and the decision to list abroad). 
 161. See Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 352 n.69, 353 (discussing the 
requirements of section 12(b)). See generally Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1993) [hereinafter Seligman, New Corporate Law] (discussing the displacement of 
state corporate governance norms by federal regulation). 
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A.  The Issuer-Driven Paradigm 
The issuer-driven paradigm of public company regulation rests on three 
pillars. First, a statute, regulator, or self-regulatory body must divide the 
marketplace for securities into discrete tiers of regulation. Often, such tiers 
describe the relevant marketplace (e.g., global, national, regional, small 
cap, or microcap) or industry sector (e.g., high-tech or internet). Second, 
the law must identify the trade-offs issuers face at each transition, as 
described in Part II, with respect to liquidity, transparency, and compliance 
obligations.162 Third, there must be an intermediary—such as an 
investment bank, broker–dealer, or exchange—that facilitates these 
transitions to calibrate and enforce the associated privileges and 
commitments on an ongoing basis. 
The underwritten IPO and exchange listing are perhaps the best 
developed systems of issuer-driven regulation. Scholars have long 
recognized investment banks as the reputational intermediary that serves as 
a gateway to public markets, even as the SEC and SROs have assumed the 
role of setting baseline disclosure standards and offering practices for 
public companies.163 Likewise, stock exchanges in the United States and 
around the world have used tiering of listed securities as a means of scaling 
the application of their corporate governance and disclosure rules to the 
needs and resources of individual issuers.164 In particular, to the extent that 
an exchange is able to coordinate the interfaces among tiers, the exchange 
could substantially reduce the cost of transitioning from one regime to 
another.165 
 
                                                                                                                     
 162.  See, e.g., Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure 
Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. ACC. & ECON. 233, 260–61 (2005) (using 
an event study to document “firm-specific costs and benefits, as well as externalities, of disclosure 
regulation” for firms that are not in compliance, already in compliance, and newly in compliance 
with FINRA’s recently adopted Exchange Act reporting requirement for OTC BB firms). 
 163. See Black & Gilson, Active Stock Market, supra note 98, at 44; Gilson & Kraakman, 
supra note 64, at 613–21 (discussing the role of the investment banker); see supra text 
accompanying note 100. 
 164. See Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 89, 
145–48 (2007) (discussing incentives for issuers to list on various exchange tiers). For example, 
issuers trading in an exchange’s pre-public tier might be able to mount an initial public offering and 
launch public trading for retail investors with greater certainty as to pricing, liquidity, and 
institutional interest. See Pritchard, supra note 1, at 1019–22 (analogizing such a market to the 
“English Premier League”). 
 165. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The Regulation 
of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355, 356–58 (2006) (discussing the 
benefits of a common trading platform both across borders and across products); see also Chris 
Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435, 
1476 (2008) (discussing the benefits of a common platform in facilitating the trading of securities 
across borders).  
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The use of exchange listing as a form of tiering has long played a 
particularly prominent role in cross-border offerings since issuers often 
view the listing rules of different national markets as stepping stones to 
higher, lower, or different levels of regulation.166 Professor John Coffee 
suggests that many non-U.S. firms might have historically chosen to cross-
list their securities in the United States, in part, based on the “higher 
likelihood of legal enforcement, the signal of profitable investment 
opportunities, the more credible promise of improved disclosure, 
contractual protections negotiated on entry into the U.S. market, [and] the 
enhanced analyst coverage” associated therewith.167  
The “passporting” privileges conferred on listed issuers in the European 
Union (EU) likewise demonstrate the potential benefits of building tiered 
regulatory regimes within a single jurisdictional area. Under EU directives, 
issuers whose securities are listed or admitted to trading in a venue 
authorized as an EU regulated market may be offered and traded 
throughout the EU in reliance upon the issuer’s home country registration 
and periodic disclosure requirements.168 Meanwhile, junior markets, such 
                                                                                                                     
 166. See Brummer, supra note 165, at 1477–78 (describing stock exchanges as “sellers of 
foreign law” consistent with the issuer-choice paradigm of securities regulation (emphasis 
omitted)); Davidoff, supra note 164, at 145–48 (discussing incentives for issuers to list on various 
exchange tiers). 
 167. John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock 
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1830 
(2002). But see Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 141, 160–62 (2003) (citing studies that suggest that cross-listing in the United States 
may allow foreign issuers to avoid more onerous corporate governance regulation in their home 
country). Markets such as London’s Alternative Investment Market, the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange, 
and Frankfurt’s former Neuer Markt similarly cater to smaller businesses using a lower-tiered listing 
as a stepping-stone to broader capital-markets access. See Jose Miguel Mendoza, Securities 
Regulation in Low-Tier Listing Venues: The Rise of the Alternative Investment Market, 13 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257, 285–89 (2008); Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 25–26; 
Mark Boslet, Some Venture-Backed IPOs Look to London’s AIM as NASDAQ Cools, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 23, 2005, at B.4B. 
 168. Article 17 of the Prospectus Directive provides that “where an offer to the public or 
admission to trading on a regulated market is provided for,” a prospectus approved by the home 
member state of an issuer “shall be valid for the public offer or the admission to trading in any 
number of host Member States” with appropriate notification of the host member states’ competent 
regulatory authorities. Directive 2003/71, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
November 2003 on the Prospectus to be Published When Securities are Offered to the Public or 
Admitted to Trading and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (EC) (amended by 
Directive 2010/73, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010, 2010 O.J. 
(L 327) 1 (EU)). Similarly Article 3(2) of the Transparency Directive provides that a host member 
state (a state in which issuers admit securities to trading on a regulated market) may not, as regards 
the admission of securities to a regulated market in its territory, impose disclosure requirements 
more stringent than those in “this Directive or in Article 6 of Directive 2003/6/EC” or on 
shareholders or other persons or entities. Directive 2004/109, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 December 2004 on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to 
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as London’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM), admit issuers without 
requiring compliance with EU directives.169 More recently, the EU has laid 
the groundwork for multilateral trading facilities that serve the small and 
medium enterprise (SME) growth market to “raise their visibility and 
profile and aid the development of common regulatory standards in the 
Union for those markets.”170 
Several academic and industry proposals to tier levels of regulation in 
the United States rely on the assumption that regulators can restrict 
participation in opaque markets to sufficiently sophisticated market 
participants.171 Under such approaches, private secondary markets could 
assume responsibility for screening admission to trading by vetting 
investors’ sophistication and capacity to absorb risk, as well as the degree 
of access to information they provide.172 However, an implicit premise of 
this structure is that trading venues, dealers, and other intermediaries can 
create market tiers or categories that supply enough liquidity from qualified 
investors to sustain trading until issuers are able to achieve different stages 
of publicness. Others suggest that public investors should be able to 
participate in lower-tiered markets, although firms might be timed out of 
such lower tiers (much as “emerging growth companies” are phased into 
Exchange Act compliance under the JOBS Act).173 
                                                                                                                     
Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and 
Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (EC) (amended by Directive 2013/50, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 13 (EU)). 
 169. See EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKETS LAW 78 (Rüdiger Veil ed., Rebecca Ahmling trans., 
2013). 
 170. Directive 2014/65, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
Markets in Financial Instruments and Amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, 
2014 O.J. (L 173) 349 (EU), ¶ 132, at 369 [hereinafter MiFID 2]. 
 171. See, e.g., Mendoza, supra note 167, at 297 (describing AIM as a “junior” market for 
predominantly “senior” investors, though AIM does seek to attract retail investors through tax and 
other incentives). Several scholars have floated approaches to eliminating statutory obstacles to 
trading among accredited or other sophisticated investors. See, e.g., Michael D. Guttentag, Patching 
a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the Rules That Require Firms to Make Periodic 
Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 208–11 (2013) (suggesting restrictions on tradability of shares and 
compliance with alternative disclosure regimes as conditions for a contingent exemption from 
periodic disclosure requirements for firms that meet the author’s proposed size and numerosity 
thresholds); Pritchard, supra note 1, at 1019–20 (restricting access to the “English Premier League” 
companies to accredited investors); Sjostrom, Carving a New Path, supra note 58, at 664 
(suggesting revisions to Rule 144 to promote an active resale market among sophisticated investors 
so that an issuer can obtain liquidity without going public). 
 172. The revisions to Rule 506(c) under Regulation D expressly contemplate such delegation. 
See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Other proposals have contemplated more aggressive self-
certification regimes in which investors would qualify themselves to participate in comparatively 
less-regulated market centers. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-
Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 279, 280 (2000).  
 173. Schwartz, Twilight of Equity, supra note 14, at 580–92 (describing the contours of an 
“emerging-firm market”). 
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B.  The Difficulty of Maintaining Issuer-Driven Tiers 
While multi-tiered exchange listing may hold promise as a tool of 
issuer-driven regulation, it has lost much of its effectiveness in the United 
States despite decades of experimentation. In some respects, lower-tiered 
markets have always struggled at attracting liquidity for small to medium-
sized enterprises, regardless of how much energy regulators and market 
operators devote to promoting investor interest. In the United States, a 
variety of additional forces are at work: some commentators cite the 
federalization of corporate governance and disclosure policy as hampering 
the flexibility afforded to exchanges and market centers to develop and 
promote such tiers, while others focus on the laxity in enforcement of 
listing standards as exchanges increasingly compete for trading volume and 
listings. 
1.  Creeping Federalization of Standards 
Scholars often cite the creeping federalization of corporate governance 
and disclosure policy as a prime factor in the erosion of the self-regulatory 
authority of exchanges.174 Congress initially limited application of the 
Exchange Act’s periodic reporting, proxy solicitation, and insider reporting 
and trading provisions to exchange-listed firms.175 Frustration with larger 
firms that refused to list on exchanges led Congress to extend Exchange 
Act reporting to a broader swath of over-the-counter firms in 1964.176 
Similarly, as the SEC has expanded and reformed Exchange Act disclosure 
requirements during the past four decades, the marginal value of voluntary 
disclosures encouraged or mandated by listing rules has arguably 
diminished.177  
While exchanges retain some incentives and discretion to promulgate 
qualitative governance rules and standards that are stricter than SEC 
requirements,178 the SEC has often viewed exchange rule making and 
                                                                                                                     
 174. See Seligman, New Corporate Law, supra note 161, at 1–3 (discussing the displacement 
of state corporate governance norms by federal regulation); see also Dombalagian, Identity Crisis, 
supra note 9, at 324–28.  
 175. Dombalagian, Identity Crisis, supra note 9, at 324 n.24.  
 176. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, 565–68 
(amending the Exchange Act to extend “disclosure requirements to the issuers of additional publicly 
traded securities” by adding section 12(g) thereto); REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES 
MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 3, at 7–17; 
Michael J. Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System for Over-the-Counter Stocks, 
55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 29–30 (1986). 
 177. See SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 562–68.  
 178. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 
SMU L. REV. 325, 329–30 (2001) [hereinafter Karmel, Future of Corporate Governance] (“Even 
after the promulgation of the Exchange Act, the NYSE was still concerned with the practices of its 
listed companies.”). In addition to the quantitative requirements for listing eligibility, the NYSE has 
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enforcement in the area of corporate governance as a means of 
americacircumventing statutory limitations on its own authority.179 
Following the SEC’s failed attempt to regulate corporate governance 
listing standards in the 1990s,180 advocates of corporate governance reform 
understandably turned to federal legislation.181 Congress’s unprecedented 
involvement in the composition and operation of corporate boards of listed 
companies over the past decade,182 however justified, threatens to leave 
increasingly little room for exchanges to differentiate listed firms in terms 
of quality.183  
At the same time, federal policy makers have made only lukewarm 
efforts to recognize privileges or provide other benefits for companies that 
choose to list. Some privileges have endured even as the signaling effect of 
a listing has diminished. The Federal Reserve Board’s margin regulations 
                                                                                                                     
historically imposed qualitative obligations, such as real-time disclosure of certain material 
information during volatile market conditions, and qualitative corporate governance rules respecting 
the independence of auditors, directors, and audit committees. See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67, 
§§ 202.03, 303A.00 (2006). NYSE listing agreements also continue to provide important 
protections for investors in exchange-listed securities by restricting the dilution of their voting 
rights in various corporate finance transactions. Id. § 313.00(A). 
 179. See Karmel, Future of Corporate Governance, supra note 178, at 352; Robert Todd 
Lang et al., Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 
BUS. LAW. 1487, 1490 (2002). Prominent examples are the SEC’s efforts to require the NYSE to 
enforce its rule against dual class recapitalizations after its own Exchange Act Rule 19c-4 was 
vacated in Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and to require exchanges 
to adopt rules governing auditor independence in the late 1990s. See, e.g., Ira M. Millstein, 
Introduction to the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 54 BUS. LAW. 1057, 1063 (1999); see also supra 
note 70 and accompanying text. 
 180. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407 (finding that the SEC exceeded its authority 
to amend exchange listing standards in adopting Rule 19c-4, which prohibited exchanges from 
listing stock of a corporation that takes any corporate action “with the effect of nullifying, 
restricting or disparately reducing the per share voting rights” of existing common stockholders 
because the rule “directly controls the substantive allocation of powers among classes of 
shareholders” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 181. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and 
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 92–94, 
121–23 (2005) [hereinafter Karmel, Dream] (discussing the federalization of stock exchange rules). 
 182.  See id. at 123 (characterizing Sarbanes–Oxley’s directive to the SEC as a “sub-
delegation of delegated authority, which is troubling as a federal law making 
methodology”); supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text (describing the audit committee 
requirements of Sarbanes–Oxley and the compensation committee requirements of Dodd–Frank). 
Congress has previously looked to the independence of boards and board committees when 
considering the legitimacy of certain corporate actions in other contexts. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. 
§ 162(m)(4)(C) (2012) (permitting corporations to deduct certain incentive-based compensation 
approved by an independent compensation committee). 
 183. See Karmel, Dream, supra note 181, at 121–23 (describing the NYSE’s decision to adopt 
various listing standards relating to corporate governance in the wake of Sarbanes–Oxley). 
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have historically treated listed and unlisted equity securities differently 
because of the differing expectations as to the liquidity of those securities 
and the efficiency of the markets in which they trade.184 Likewise, federal 
and state law may still steer U.S. institutional investors toward investments 
in listed securities due to historical restrictions on institutional 
participation in control.185 
Even when policy makers attempt to create privileges for exchange-
listed companies, it may be difficult to use those privileges as organizing 
principles for reinforcing a system of tiered listing. For example, Congress 
sought to preempt the application of state registration requirements to top-
tiered, exchange-listed securities as part of the National Securities Markets 
Improvements Act of 1996 (NSMIA), thereby codifying exemptions for 
exchange-listed companies that largely permeated blue-sky laws at the 
time.186 Because Congress later extended the same privilege to privately 
placed securities under Rule 506, however, the NSMIA exemption 
effectively undermines a nontrivial incentive to develop a progressive 
listing regime.187 
                                                                                                                     
 184. Generally speaking, broker–dealers may not extend credit against any “[n]onmargin, 
nonexempted equity security” because there is little guarantee that a broker–dealer will be able to 
liquidate the securities at a price reasonably related to market value after a customer default. 12 
C.F.R. § 220.12(e) (2014); see also id. § 220.7 (setting maximum loan value of nonmargin stock 
and all other collateral for extensions of credit by banks and other lenders at their “good faith” loan 
value). Under Federal Reserve Board Regulations T and U, broker–dealers, banks, and non-bank 
lenders may lend customers up to 50% of the market value of any margin equity security (i.e., the 
customer must maintain equity, or “required margin,” of the remaining 50% of the purchase price) 
and require “good faith” margin for debt securities. Id. §§ 220.12(a), 221.7(a). SRO rules permit 
customers to finance securities purchases as long as they generally maintain minimum equity (or 
“maintenance margin”) in both equity and debt securities. See, e.g., NYSE RULE 431. 
 185. See, e.g., Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap 
for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 306–15 (2007) (describing 
rules that restrict mutual funds and pension funds from engaging in certain types of investments). 
See generally ROE, supra note 20 (providing historical evidence that banks, insurers, mutual funds, 
and other institutional investors in the United States—unlike Germany, Japan, and other 
jurisdictions—have been actively discouraged from exercising a controlling interest in U.S. 
companies due to historical circumstance); infra note 279and accompanying text. 
 186. See National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 
§ 18(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3417–18 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A) (2012)) (preempting state 
law registration and qualification requirements for “covered securit[ies],” including securities 
“listed, or authorized for listing, on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock 
Exchange, or listed on the National Market System of the Nasdaq Stock Market (or any successor to 
such entities)”). 
 187. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 151, 188–96 (2010) (criticizing the regulatory no-man’s land for privately placed securities 
resulting from the extension of section 18 of the Securities Act to Rule 506 offerings). The SEC has 
proposed to extend state law preemption to Regulation A+ offerings as well. See supra note 34 and 
accompanying text. 
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2.  Competition Among Exchanges 
Competition among exchanges and market centers is also frequently 
blamed for eroding much of the freedom that exchanges traditionally 
enjoyed in maintaining higher listing standards. Primary exchanges—such 
as the NYSE, NASDAQ, and the former American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX)188—have long competed for listing and trading revenues.189 
While these exchanges have remained successful at preserving the prestige 
of a primary listing, regional exchanges and alternative trading systems 
have succeeded in diverting substantial trading volume away from the 
trading facilities of the listing exchanges.190 Meanwhile, foreign exchanges 
have gained ground on the NYSE and NASDAQ in attracting primary 
listings.191  
To be fair, one may attribute much of the increase in competition to the 
SEC’s efforts to deregulate exchange rules. Over the past several decades, 
the SEC has labored to eliminate many of the anticompetitive privileges 
once enjoyed by exchanges regarding listing and trading: not only has the 
SEC made it easier to trade securities off of an exchange, but it has 
pressured the exchanges to make it easier for issuers to delist as well.192 
Other elements of regulatory policy conversely squeeze the profitability of 
trading to the point that the liquidity commitments of listing exchanges 
may become increasingly desirable. For example, some commentators have 
                                                                                                                     
 188. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A) (recognizing the listing standards of the NYSE, 
AMEX, and the top tier of NASDAQ as the standard for preemption of state registration 
requirements). AMEX is now known as NYSE MKT. News Release, NYSE, NYSE Amex LLC to 
Be Renamed NYSE MKT LLC (May 10, 2012), available at http://www1.nyse.com/press/
1336646911531.html. 
 189. See, e.g., Lang et al., supra note 179, at 1491 (“[B]oth the American Stock Exchange 
LLC (Amex) and Nasdaq have adopted less stringent corporate governance listing standards to 
compete with the NYSE for listings.”). Historically, exchanges derived their profits from three 
principal sources: listing fees, trading and market data fees, and membership fees. See Regulation of 
Market Information Fees and Revenues, Exchange Act Release No. 42208, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,613, 
70,624–25 (Dec. 17, 1999).  
 190. See Maureen O’Hara & Mao Ye, Is Market Fragmentation Harming Market Quality?, 
100 J. FIN. ECON. 459, 465–67 (2011) (analyzing the increase in market fragmentation as a result of 
the primary exchanges—the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX—losing market share to alternative 
trading venues). 
 191. See Aaron Lucchetti, U.S. Falls Behind in Stock Listings, WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2011, 
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703421204576329400112880300 
(paid subscription required) (illustrating the 43% decline in the number of U.S. listings from 1991–
2011 and the concomitant rise of listings on foreign exchanges); see also Cornerstone Study, supra 
note 136, at 9 (noting the uptick in U.S. listings and IPO activity following the passage of the JOBS 
Act). 
 192. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling Self-
Regulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1122–33 (2005) 
[hereinafter Dombalagian, Demythologizing]. 
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criticized the push to decimalization and the enhanced scrutiny of market-
maker spreads under the Volcker Rule for reducing liquidity in the unlisted 
over-the-counter market.193 
Whatever the cause, primary exchanges have a strong incentive to keep 
their listing standards sufficiently flexible to attract and retain issuers, 
whether for good or for ill.194 Commentators have noted the tendency of 
exchanges to waive corporate governance rules for foreign issuers who are 
not subject to comparable rules in their home country or to delay 
involuntary delisting proceedings for larger companies that fail to meet 
qualitative listing requirements.195 Skeptics argue that Congress and the 
SEC should strip exchange listing of its remaining significance in federal 
securities law rather than use the listing process as a focal point for 
coordinating federal and SRO policy.196  
While this argument has some appeal, there are significant legal and 
historical differences between exchange listing and other certification 
mechanisms. First, the SEC must approve material changes to listing 
standards. Even in the muddy waters of a principles-based system of self-
regulation, exchanges cannot unilaterally water down their listing standards 
without the SEC’s assent.197 Shifting certain aspects of public company 
regulation out of the SEC and onto self-regulatory bodies, moreover, 
insulates them from political scrutiny without a loss of SEC oversight.198 In 
                                                                                                                     
 193. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(c)(6) (requiring the SEC to “examine the impact that 
decimalization has had on the number of initial public offerings since its implementation” as well as 
“on liquidity for small and middle capitalization company securities and whether there is sufficient 
economic incentive to support trading operations in these securities in penny increments”); Order 
Directing the Exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to Submit a Tick Size 
Pilot Plan, Exchange Act Release No. 72460, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,840 (June 30, 2014) (ordering U.S. 
stock exchanges and FINRA to develop and implement a pilot program to widen quoting 
increments for certain small capitalization stocks); see also Prohibitions and Restrictions on 
Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5579 & n.553 (Jan. 31, 2014) (discussing commentators’ 
concerns that a narrow exemption for market making under the Volcker Rule would reduce market-
maker interest in the securities of small and midsized issuers and companies). 
 194. See, e.g., Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure 
Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: “Are We There Yet?,” 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135, 
221 & n. 413 (1998) (praising the flexibility of exchange listing standards relative to SEC rule 
making); NYSE Euronext, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 23 (Feb. 26, 2013) (discussing the 
competitive pressures of exchange listing). 
 195. Lang et al., supra note 179, at 1514–15. 
 196. See, e.g., Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing 
Standards Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 BUS. LAW. 1461, 1462 (1992) (suggesting that 
exchange corporate governance standards are “marketing campaigns” that provide little substantive 
protection for shareholders). 
 197. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2)(C)(i); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (2014). 
 198. Aulana L. Peters, Independent Agencies: Government’s Scourge or Salvation?, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 286, 291. But see Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators: A 
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addition, exchanges cannot require their market makers to commit capital 
to firms that fail to draw sufficient trading interest or whose shares trade in 
such a sufficiently thin market that they run the risk of manipulation.199 
 
* * * 
 
As with other regulatory functions formerly performed by national 
securities exchanges, listing may over time evolve into a self-funding 
regulatory function in the United States segregated financially and 
operationally from the trading operations of registered exchanges.200 For 
example, as stock exchanges began to demutualize into for-profit 
companies, the member regulation arms of the NYSE and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers merged to establish FINRA as the single 
self-regulatory body for the securities industry.201 While listing privileges 
in the United States are largely a duopoly enjoyed by the NYSE and 
NASDAQ (with other registered exchanges sharing in a sliver of the 
market share),202 the proliferation of trading venues might counsel in favor 
of spinning off listing activity to a similarly constituted self-regulatory 
authority in the future.203 
C.  The Alternative of Metrics-Based Approaches 
Legislative and regulatory attempts to exclude or minimize issuer 
choice in regulation default to quantitative criteria. To be effective, such 
metrics must generally be both quantifiable and verifiable: the long-
standing “financial milestones” employed in tiering registration and 
                                                                                                                     
Survey, 80 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1239, 1253–56 (2007) (noting the criticism that regulatory oversight 
may be insufficient to counter the effects of political insulation). 
 199. See Jonathan Macey et al., Down and out in the Stock Market: The Law and Economics of 
the Delisting Process, 51 J.L. & ECON. 683, 709–10 (2008) (suggesting that “[a]n optimal listing 
policy [hypothetically] should provide optimal liquidity for a stock consistent with the exchange’s 
interest of making, or at least not losing, money while protecting both current and future investors 
in the company”). 
 200. See, e.g., Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 198, at 1294 (noting the trend to segregate the 
regulatory functions of exchanges and other SROs from activities in jurisdictions that rely on 
“cooperation” between SROs and administrative agencies that oversee them).  
 201. HAZEN, supra note 31, § 14.3[3], at 119–21 (describing the creation of FINRA). 
 202. See generally Daniel M. Gray, The Essential Role of Regulation in Promoting Equity 
Market Competition, 1 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 395, 398–99 (2006) (noting market 
participants’ concerns regarding the duopoly between the NYSE and NASDAQ). 
 203. See Macey et al., supra note 199, at 712 (providing an example of Canada’s Market 
Regulatory Service as an independent regulatory body responsible for upholding Universal Market 
Integrity Rules in Canadian markets and delisting noncompliant firms). FINRA performs a similar 
function in the United States with respect to the enforcement of business conduct rules by 
agreement with virtually all major U.S. securities exchanges. See HAZEN, supra note 31, § 14.3[3], 
at 119–21. 
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periodic disclosure obligations have historically included size as well as 
numerosity, age, or seasoning.204 Moreover, a system of metrics-based 
regulation should ensure a reasonable scaling of regulatory obligations to 
individual tiers and provide an efficient mechanism for issuers to migrate 
from one tier to another and back. 
1.  Identifying Criteria and Metrics 
The most difficult task in quantifying an issuer’s progression down the 
pathway to publicness is to identify relevant criteria and apply appropriate 
metrics to monitor and enforce the issuer’s progress. Policy makers often 
justify imposing higher disclosure or governance standards on larger 
issuers because larger issuers engage in more regulated conduct, generate 
more significant positive and negative spillover effects, or are simply better 
able to afford the necessary controls.205 The numerosity of shareholders 
captures the intuition that legal requirements should vary based on the 
number of individuals who benefit and the difficulty of promoting 
collective action.206 Age and seasoning are also factors that have become 
increasingly important, though scholars offer different theories as to why 
the relative age of a firm should justify more or less regulation.207 
However relevant these milestones may be, the metrics used to measure 
them may be archaic, outmoded, or susceptible to abuse. Issuers may game 
their capital structure to avoid triggering metrics for monitoring 
numerosity, as discussed above, by reducing the fungibility of securities or 
aggressively exploiting the gap between record and beneficial 
ownership.208 Creating new metrics, nevertheless, requires consideration of 
                                                                                                                     
 204. See Schwartz, Law and Economics, supra note 10, at 349–50 (discussing the academic 
attention that the issue of scaling disclosure requirements by measures of size and seasoning has 
drawn). Professors Langevoort and Thompson have proposed extending such metrics to calibrate 
the application of social disclosures as well. See, e.g., Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra 
note 1, at 379–80 (recommending a $700 million threshold consisting of “the top 20% to 30% of all 
registered companies” for the application of enhanced public disclosure requirements). 
 205. See, e.g., Schwartz, Law and Economics, supra note 10, at 367–69, 381–83, 387–89 
(citing these and other commentators’ arguments in favor of higher disclosure standards for larger 
issuers). One might measure size in a variety of ways, either by market capitalization for companies 
that have a public trading price or various measures of accounting assets (total assets or net worth) 
as calculated under generally accepted accounting principles. See id. at 368 & n.119. 
 206. In recommending legislation to Congress, the SEC considered, among other alternatives, 
whether transfers of stock, concentrations of holdings, or trading interest in interdealer markets 
might serve as alternative measures of public interest. REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES 
MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 3, at 18 (1963). 
The number of shareholders was ultimately adopted, “perhaps not surprisingly, as the single most 
workable and most meaningful criterion” to trigger periodic disclosure requirements for unlisted 
securities. Id. 
 207. See infra text accompanying notes 215–217. 
 208. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
45
Dombalagian: Principles for Publicness
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
694 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
the attendant compliance costs. Volume-based metrics, for example, may 
complement or supplement size and numerosity requirements without 
introducing significant additional operational costs209 to the extent that 
systems are already in place for collecting relevant trading data.210 Other 
metrics, particularly those better linked with social disclosures, might be 
more challenging. For example, it may be more appropriate to target social 
disclosures through measures of economic footprint such as sales volume, 
earnings, market share, size of payroll, number of employees, and other 
factors.211 However, building systems for standardizing such data might be 
excessively costly in light of the benefits.212 
2.  Monotonicity of Regulation 
A second concern with metrics-based approaches is the delicacy with 
which policy makers can scale the scope of regulation to metrics. A 
recurrent theme of regulatory reform proposals is that issuers should enjoy 
reduced disclosure and substantive obligations in successively lower tiers 
                                                                                                                     
 209. See, e.g., Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 341 (supporting volume-
based thresholds). But see Guttentag, supra note 171, at 199–200 (suggesting that not enough 
empirical evidence exists to select volume-based thresholds for regulating disclosure). For example, 
the SEC has endorsed using U.S. trading volume for purposes of determining whether to require 
foreign issuers to register under the Exchange Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) & note 1 (2014) 
(exempting foreign private issuers from Exchange Act registration and reporting obligations under 
section 12(g) of the Exchange Act if, inter alia, “at least 55 percent of the trading in the subject 
class of securities on a worldwide basis took place in, on or through the facilities” of securities 
markets in the foreign jurisdiction where it is listed). 
 210. Quotation and transaction information about exchange-listed securities in the United 
States is collected through national market system plans overseen by the SEC. FINRA’s OTC 
Bulletin Board Service collects transaction information about shares in certain Exchange Act 
reporting companies, while its OTC Reporting Facility collects information with respect to all other 
equity securities traded otherwise than on an exchange in the United States. FINRA MANUAL, supra 
note 50, R. 6520–30, 6610. Various vendors provide electronic interdealer quotation systems for 
unlisted equity securities as well. See OTC MARKETS, http://www.otcmarkets.com (last visited Mar. 
14, 2015); OTC Bulletin Board, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/otcbb/otc-bulletin-board-
otcbb (last visited Mar. 14, 2015); Macey et al., supra note 199, at 698–709 (observing that some 
delisted firms may enjoy substantial trading volume in such unlisted markets, including the former 
Pink Sheets market, and in some cases are superior to that of listed exchanges to the extent that 
unlisted markets are not subject to restrictions on tick size or affirmative market making 
obligations).  
 211. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a)–(b) (West 2014) (purporting to regulate aspects of 
corporate governance based on certain predominating contacts with the forum state such as property 
holdings, payroll, sales, and other factors).  
 212. See, e.g., Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 70443, Exchange Act Release 
Nos. 9452, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,560, 60,569–73 (Oct. 1, 2013) (discussing the complexities of 
calculation and alternative methodologies in light of the fact that many companies simply do not 
keep track of the information necessary to perform the “total compensation” calculations required 
by the Exchange Act). 
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of trading, both to reduce the cost of regulation for smaller firms and 
because of the regulatory restrictions or natural limitations on the number, 
type, and sophistication of investors eligible to participate in them.213 
Advocates of tiered market structures thus typically begin with the 
assumption that policy makers will set a baseline for paradigmatically 
public companies and selectively whittle away disclosure requirements, 
governance standards, compliance burdens, and other regulatory elements 
to craft “less regulated” tiers.214 
The implicit assumption of monotonicity in regulation is questionable 
for a variety of reasons. One may view some aspects of regulation as 
complementary rather than supplementary. For example, regulators need 
not decrease compliance costs and litigation risk for smaller issuers in 
tandem; instead, they may choose to treat them as alternatives for investor 
protection. In other cases, the implications of a metric (such as age) may 
not be clear.215 One could argue, depending on one’s perspective, that 
seasoned companies should enjoy reduced compliance costs on the theory 
that they will have developed a following of outside analysts after a 
number of years,216 or conversely, that unseasoned companies should enjoy 
reduced compliance costs to encourage them to go public sooner.217 
The administrative process makes such fine-tuning difficult. If one 
assumes that a regulatory or self-regulatory authority should have some 
discretion to tinker with regulatory burdens as market conditions change, it 
is far easier to deregulate than to impose additional regulation. Defenders 
of the SEC note that the SEC has extensive experience with granting both 
general and individualized relief tailored to specific securities marketing or 
                                                                                                                     
 213. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, at 6 (2012) (noting that the JOBS Act “provides 
temporary regulatory relief to small companies, which encourages them to go public, yet ensures 
their eventual compliance with regulatory requirements as they grow larger”). 
 214. See, e.g., Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 352–53. 
 215. See, e.g., id. at 383–84 (expressing doubts about “on ramp” by time rather than size). 
 216. The SEC uses size and seasoning as a metric for relieving firms of the burden of 
producing duplicative information under Form S-3. See, e.g., Revisions to the Eligibility 
Requirements for Primary Securities Offerings on Forms S-3 and F-3, Exchange Act Release No. 
8878, 72 Fed. Reg. 73,534, 73,536 (Dec. 27, 2007) (noting that “[p]ublic float has for many years 
been used as an approximate measure of a stock’s market following and, consequently, the degree 
of efficiency with which the market absorbs information and reflects it in the price of a security”). 
 217. See Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 40, at 8 (intimating that the difficulty of reversing 
the process of going public stalls the IPO decision); see also infra note 230 (discussing strategies 
for companies going private). Reversibility may be particularly important given the unpredictability 
of market conditions in the years following an IPO. For example, the five-year survival rate for 
companies after their IPO stood at 52% for IPOs during the period from 1996 to 2000, 66.7% from 
2001 to 2008, and 89.8% from 2009 to 2013. Cornerstone Study, supra note 136, at 25. 
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distribution strategies.218 However, as courts more rigorously challenge 
agency discretion and cost-benefit determinations,219 it is increasingly 
difficult for agencies to add new obligations without encountering the 
prospect of significant litigation.220  
3.  Lack of Flexibility 
Finally, metrics-based approaches hamper the flexibility of issuers to 
calibrate the preferred degree of publicness in line with business 
conditions. As private equity firms have made it easier for firms to “go 
private,”221 managers of public companies may find it beneficial to 
oscillate between privateness and publicness during the life of a business. 
For example, managers of a firm may find it desirable to temporarily 
escape the public gaze to implement a long-term vision or take aggressive 
measures at the expense of short-term profits.222  
A transition from higher to lower levels of regulatory disclosure might 
nevertheless trap public investors in an informational black hole.223 Absent 
                                                                                                                     
 218. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political 
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 552, 580 (2001) (suggesting that the SEC’s current 
approach is “highly tailored” and offers a great deal of private choice). 
 219. Cf. James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting 
the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1835 (2012) 
(“In a contemporary legal and political climate that is defined by a rising skepticism of government 
and more particularly of regulation, the SEC (and for that matter all independent regulatory 
agencies) must accept that it cannot support its rule making only through generalized, undeveloped 
assertions of a proposed rule’s impact on competition, efficiency, and capital formation.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 220. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (involving a 
challenge to Exchange Act Rule 14a-11); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) (reviewing a rule created by the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940); see 
also Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. 
ON REG. 289, 290 (2013) (discussing these developments). 
 221. See Bartlett, supra note 130, at 11–12; Kent Greenfield, The Impact of “Going Private” 
on Corporate Stakeholders, 3 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 75, 76 (2008) (noting that these 
private equity firms “buy up companies and take them out of the public markets, allowing them to 
be shielded from public scrutiny”). In “going private” transactions, either the issuer or an outside 
bidder must effectively repurchase sufficient publicly traded equity securities through a cash-out 
merger, reverse stock split, or reverse tender offer to fall below the section 12(g) threshold for 
Exchange Act reporting. See supra note 54. 
 222. Shareholder wealth maximization—combined with the pressures of providing quarterly 
reports, earnings guidance, and other soft information—arguably might force managers of some 
public companies to behave myopically. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 221, at 80–81. But see 
Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 
977, 978–81 (2013) (challenging the “short-termist argument”). 
 223.  See Macey et al., supra note 199, at 710 (asserting that the delisting of an issuer may 
protect prospective investors at the expense of existing shareholders insofar as delisting may 
adversely “affect[] the liquidity of . . . the informational environment surrounding” their 
investment). 
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a forced sale of shares, any remaining shareholders in a company that 
decides to go private must sell their securities at prices set in an illiquid or 
inefficient market or seek other relief.224 Some commentators have 
suggested that, as long as there is sufficient purchasing interest among 
sophisticated investors, retail investors would not suffer significant harm if 
a public market suddenly went private.225 Others, however, view the risks 
of inefficient pricing, manipulation, and incomplete reporting as too great 
to permit issuers to withdraw from public trading without buying out retail 
investors.226 
As a result, the ease with which firms can elect to transition back and 
forth among various tiers of publicness is an important consideration in the 
design of any regulatory scheme. Professor Robert Bartlett’s study of the 
reporting practices of firms that have gone private suggests the appeal of a 
regulatory regime that offers issuers some flexibility in downgrading their 
level of publicness while continuing to supply information to key 
stakeholder constituencies on par with the Exchange Act.227 Similarly, 
David Pompilio and Professors Jonathan Macey and Maureen O’Hara 
suggest that the delisting of larger companies should turn on a balancing of 
the economic interests of issuers, investors, and exchanges.228 
While issuer-driven decisions to switch status may be prone to abuse, 
metrics-based regulation can force issuers to pursue unwieldy strategies to 
recalibrate their degree of publicness. Prior to the 1964 Securities Act 
Amendments, an issuer could in theory (with the consent of its 
shareholders) simply delist to avoid Exchange Act reporting rules.229 
                                                                                                                     
 224. Cf. Marco Ventoruzzo, Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis and Reform Proposals, 
50 VA. J. INT’L L. 841, 883–84 (2010) (discussing the availability of appraisal rights for delisting in 
various EU member states). 
 225. See Pritchard, supra note 1, at 1023–24. 
 226. See Schwartz, Twilight of Equity, supra note 14, at 564–76. 
 227. See Bartlett, supra note 130, at 43–44 (discussing the result of the exercise of registration 
rights, a private equity exit, or other transaction). According to Professor Bartlett, smaller firms 
were more likely to resort to “SOX-free forms of financing,” such as leveraged loans, to escape 
Exchange Act disclosure permanently. Id. 
 228. See Macey et al., supra note 199, at 710. 
 229. Most U.S. exchanges historically discouraged delistings by requiring audit committee 
approval or a supermajority vote of the shareholders, ostensibly to protect shareholders against a 
loss of liquidity resulting from delisting; critics nevertheless contended that such measures 
represented efforts by primary exchanges such as the NYSE to prevent competition for listings. See, 
e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change and 
Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Repealing Exchange Rule 500 
and Amending Section 806 of the Listed Company Manual, Exchange Act Release No. 48720, 68 
Fed. Reg. 62,645, 62,646 (Nov. 5, 2003) (approving the repeal of former NYSE Rule 500); Self-
Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule 
Change and Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 Relating to Voluntary Delistings by Listed Companies, 
Exchange Act Release No. 41634, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,633 (July 27, 1999) (approving elimination of 
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Today, firms must buy out their public shareholders in “going private” 
transactions230 or otherwise engineer a reduction below the Exchange Act’s 
300-shareholder floor231 to avoid compliance with the Exchange Act’s 
reporting and monitoring requirements. Because such transactions often 
require a significant financial commitment from outside equity as well as 
concomitant returns, they run the risk that management will collude with 
bidders to maipulate the company’s share price.232  
IV.  PRINCIPLED TIERS OF PUBLIC COMPANY REGULATION 
An issuer’s decision to become more or less public should ideally 
integrate its interests with objective determinations: there is little point in 
subjecting an issuer and its management to heightened levels of public 
scrutiny if the issuer is neither willing nor able to withstand the public 
gaze. A hierarchy of principles structured in the form of increasing 
regulatory privileges and obligations might create the appropriate 
incentives for issuers to progress through stages of publicness as they reach 
critical milestones, while preserving some room for negotiation with 
regulators and intermediaries at or near inflection points between tiers of 
regulation.  
Consider, for example, how regulatory concepts such as suitability, 
efficiency, and perhaps representativeness, already inform the 
understanding of what it means to be public. Suitability ties the offer of 
securities to the adequacy of information available to brokers and the 
financial circumstances of the investor.233 At the lower end of the spectrum 
                                                                                                                     
the Rule 500 shareholder vote); see also Dombalagian, Demythologizing, supra note 192, at 1128–
29. Today, an issuer may delist from the NYSE upon approval of the issuer’s board and compliance 
with the requirements of SEC Rule 12d2-2(c). See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 67, § 806.02. 
 230. See supra note 221. 
 231. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(4) (2012). Issuers have engaged in questionable practices to achieve 
this objective. See supra note 54. Professor Jesse M. Fried has proposed requiring a shareholder 
vote, similar to the delisting requirement under former NYSE Rule 500 to effect a transaction that 
would result in a firm “going dark.” See Fried, supra note 54, at 157–60. 
 232. See, e.g., Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 1, 55–59 (2008) (discussing regulatory constraints on private equity transactions). 
 233. See Therese H. Maynard, The Affirmative Defense of Reasonable Care Under Section 
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 123 (1993) (“[T]he suitability 
doctrine has been interpreted to require the broker–dealer to undertake an affirmative investigation 
into her client’s background so as to ascertain the information necessary to formulate appropriate 
recommendations.”); Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities 
Transactions, 54 BUS. LAW. 1557, 1557 (1999) (“The suitability doctrine, always somewhat 
nebulous and amorphous with respect to its content and parameters, may be broadly defined as a 
duty on the part of the broker to recommend to a customer only those securities which are suitable 
to the investment objectives and peculiar needs of that particular customer. The suitability doctrine 
entails the matching of two elements: (i) the investment objectives, peculiar needs, and other 
investments of the particular customer with (ii) the characteristics of the security which is being 
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of publicness, it may be appropriate to view suitability as a filter through 
which to regulate the diffusion of securities.234 Similarly, efficiency ties the 
perceived integrity of market prices to the accuracy and continuity of 
mechanisms for collecting and disseminating inside and outside 
information. An even more rarified principle of representativeness might 
link the macroeconomic significance of a particular issuer to the issuer’s 
power to shape business practices in a given industry. 
Accordingly, one might classify the regulatory privileges and 
obligations of issuers at various stages of publicness based on the extent to 
which issuers, their securities, and the markets in which they trade resonate 
with these principles. For example: 
• Suitability may serve as a principle for restricting the diffusion of 
securities until an issuer is prepared to generate adequate public 
disclosure about and attract adequate public diligence into its 
securities. • Efficiency may serve as a principle for coordinating regulatory 
privileges and obligations designed to elicit soft information and 
improve price accuracy, such as enhanced controls, governance, and 
protocols for the dissemination of real-time, material information.  • Representativeness may serve as a principle for fostering better 
corporate governance and greater social responsibility among firms 
that seek recognition as macroeconomic benchmarks. 
The goal of such principles-based tiers would be to calibrate both 
privileges and obligations in light of the ability and needs of the issuer and 
its investors. Commentators generally focus on the costs of increased 
publicness—heightened disclosure, monitoring, and accountability—and 
whether and when these costs should apply to particular issuers; less 
frequently discussed is the propriety of conferring regulatory privileges 
among such firms. While the primary benefit of publicness is access to 
deeper capital, calibrating privileges to obligations can both sharpen the 
incentives for becoming and staying public and reinforce a tiered system of 
public company regulation by better balancing costs and benefits.235 
A.  Tier 1: An Unsuitable Private Resale Market 
As discussed above, a private resale market limited to accredited or 
sophisticated investors might best serve the needs of investors in emerging 
companies that are not yet ready to assume the risk and cost of ceding 
                                                                                                                     
recommended.”(footnote omitted)).  
 234. See supra Subection II.A.2.ii. 
 235. Apart from modifications to the Exchange Act’s reporting threshold, a self-regulatory 
body—preferably, a FINRA-like listing body unaffiliated with any trading market—could largely 
implement this Article’s proposal through rules without replacing or conflicting with the Securities 
Act. See supra note 203. 
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control and information to the marketplace.236 Given the lack of access and 
information attendant to such issuers, one approach to restricting the resale 
market is to consider their securities presumptively unsuitable for purchase 
by unaccredited investors.237 Unaccredited investors would be able to 
purchase such shares on an unsolicited basis (whether in a direct offering 
or otherwise), but broker–dealers would bear the burden of proving 
suitability for any recommendations they make or any sales or resales they 
solicit. Courts or regulators might enforce such a presumption primarily 
through arbitration or litigation on the basis of the Rule 10b-5 implied 
cause of action.238 
A market tier based on a presumption of unsuitability would allow 
unlimited transactions among accredited investors without the risk of more 
than minimal leakage to retail investors.239 The presumption of 
unsuitability could be overcome in two ways: (1) if a broker–dealer takes 
“reasonable steps” to verify the accredited status of the investor;240 or (2) if 
a broker–dealer can prove that it has undertaken independent diligence to 
obtain and provide sufficient information about the issuer and the security, 
in light of the investor’s ability to evaluate the merits and risks of the 
investment, such that the investor can make an informed investment 
decision.241 This might allow for the possibility of “friends-and-family” 
resales or self-directed participation by certain sophisticated investors in 
resale markets.242  
The advantage of a suitability principle is that it would allow the SEC 
to shift some of the more nettlesome elements of private placement 
regulation to SRO administration over time. The variety of factors that one 
could take into account in accrediting investors is institutionally better 
suited to an SRO such as FINRA (subject to SEC oversight and 
                                                                                                                     
 236. See supra note 171. 
 237. This presumption would thus place the burden of proof on the broker–dealer to 
demonstrate compliance with its “reasonable diligence” obligation under the suitability rule (similar 
to the Rule 506(c) verification requirement) rather than on enforcement officials or the investor in a 
private right of action. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 239. In effect, this Article’s proposal creates a private resale market similar to the structure that 
Professors A.C. Pritchard, William Sjostrom, Michael Guttentag, and other commentators envision. 
See supra note 171. 
 240. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii) (2014). 
 241. FINRA’s suitability rule for resales of OTC equity securities imposes additional diligence 
requirements on broker–dealers to “review[] the current financial statements of the issuer, current 
material business information about the issuer, and [make] a determination that such information, 
and any other information available, provides a reasonable basis under the circumstances for 
making the recommendation.” FINRA MANUAL, supra note 50, R. 2114. 
 242. Cf. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (citing the sophistication requirement of SEC Rule 
506(b)). 
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approval).243 Moreover, to the extent that SEC rules restricting resales are 
necessarily interwoven with an analysis of the role of the issuer or 
intermediary in a “distribution,” an SRO-directed approach is more 
consistent with the authority of self-regulatory bodies to regulate secondary 
market operations under the Exchange Act.244 
A second advantage is to gradually introduce issuers to the discipline of 
a regulated marketplace by conditioning the development of a secondary 
resale market on the provision of information to regulated intermediaries. 
Some commentators advocating recognition of private secondary markets 
assume that market operators will perform some vetting process with 
respect to both the issuer and its trading customers.245 While an issuer-
based system of verification may be reliable and cost effective for the 
initial placement of interests, it may be more troubling to permit the free 
                                                                                                                     
 243. A recent U.S. Government Accountability Office study on the definition of “accredited 
investor” surveyed a variety of alternative criteria relating to the investor’s understanding of 
financial risk to the relatively mechanistic criteria under Regulation D. 2013 AI Report, supra note 
32, at 20–28. While most of the survey’s respondents felt that net worth was the best criterion for 
determining who is an accredited investor, a principal concern the study raised was that increasing 
the net worth and net income thresholds—through a periodic inflation adjustment—could 
unnecessarily shrink the pool of investors eligible to participate in Regulation D offerings. Id. at 12; 
see also Rodrigues, supra note 6, at 3422–25 (discussing the under- and over-inclusiveness of the 
accredited investor definition). Among the alternative standards related to an understanding of 
financial risk, commentators suggested that the definition should include the use of a registered 
investment adviser, a license and certification standard, an education standard, an examination 
requirement, or some sort of self-certification. 2013 AI Report, supra note 32, at 24–28. The 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive similarly permits a more searching inquiry into the 
sophistication of an investor that opts to be classified as a “professional client.” MiFID 2, supra 
note 170, annex II, §§ I–II, at 484. 
The administration of such rules is arguably better suited to the iterative supervision of a self-
regulatory body like FINRA rather than the brute application of statutory thresholds or SEC rules. 
FINRA’s suitability rule requires a broker–dealer to have “a reasonable basis to believe that the 
institutional customer is capable of evaluating investment risks independently, both in general and 
with regard to particular transactions and investment strategies involving a security or securities” to 
fulfill its suitability obligation to an institutional customer without further diligence into the security 
or the customer’s investment profile. FINRA MANUAL, supra note 50, R. 2111(b). 
 244. It is arguable that the current practice of regulating secondary market trading in restricted 
securities under section 4(a)(1) rather than SRO suitability rules allows for the possibility of issuer 
liability to downstream purchasers of securities sold in unregistered, nonexempt transactions. See 
supra note 35 (discussing the background of section 4(a)(1) of the Securities Act). To the extent 
that investors often have little recourse against issuers in failed offerings, such liability might not be 
as relevant as intermediary liability. 
 245. Cf. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Rebalancing Private Placement Regulation, 36 SEATTLE L. 
REV. 1143, 1161–64 (2013) [hereinafter Sjostrom, Rebalancing] (proposing tailored civil liability 
for intermediaries in private placement transactions patterned after section 11 of the Securities Act). 
More saliently, private secondary market operators may come to appreciate that such vetting is 
necessary to create liquidity in the absence of direct relationships between prospective investors and 
issuers. See supra note 101 (discussing limitations on liquidity in private secondary markets). 
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resale of securities in a secondary market without some diligence or 
information-gathering obligation.246  
B.  Tier 2: A Suitably Liquid Market for Publicly Traded Securities 
The second tier comprises those securities that exhibit sufficient 
secondary market liquidity to warrant removing the presumption against 
suitability without imposing the full weight of Exchange Act reporting. 
While structuring such a tier is challenging, this Article envisions that Tier 
2 would resemble a slow-motion IPO that provides issuers some breathing 
room to build secondary market liquidity and the disclosure and corporate 
governance mechanisms necessary to transition to a full-blown public 
secondary market.247 Professors Jeff Schwartz and Adam Pritchard 
similarly envision an intermediary phase between private resales and an 
efficient public market for “emerging firms,” much as London’s AIM and 
the JOBS Act impose lower compliance obligations for smaller or 
“emerging growth” companies.248 
The requirements of such a tier must therefore reflect a balancing of 
liquidity, disclosure, and verification. For example, part of the traditional 
appeal of an IPO is the commitment of the underwriter to stimulate 
secondary market demand for investors in an offering.249 To the extent that 
building liquidity is a prerequisite to allowing broader retail investment, 
such issuers would need some liquidity commitment from an exchange, 
investment bank, or market makers to enter Tier 2. Alternatively, such 
issuers would need other evidence of sufficient trading interest to provide a 
reasonable expectation of liquidity for investors. Unlike a traditional IPO, 
the promotional efforts of the investment bank may evolve during the 
issuer’s time in Tier 2,250 rather than around a carefully timed filing and 
effective date.251  
                                                                                                                     
 246. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11–15c2-12 (codifying provisions for OTC securities and 
municipal securities). The adequacy of those efforts may be of great reputational interest in the case 
of systems that cater to accredited investors and may be the subject of public enforcement, 
litigation, or arbitration in the case of broker–dealers that place securities with nonaccredited 
investors. 
 247. There is nothing to prevent an issuer from mounting a traditional IPO and moving into a 
higher tier more quickly. But this tier would give the issuer the option to assemble the components 
of the IPO more gradually. 
 248. See Schwartz, Twilight of Equity, supra note 14, at 580–90; Pritchard, supra note 1, at 
1018–23. Professor Pritchard envisions that allowing companies to develop a reporting history and 
price discovery before permitting widespread retail investment in an at-the-market offering may 
obviate the negative features of IPOs. See id. 
 249. See Langevoort & Thompson, IPOs, supra note 7, at 911–12; see also Chen & Ritter, 
supra note 25, at 1116–19 (discussing the importance of commitment to ongoing analyst coverage 
in the pricing of IPOs). 
 250. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
 251. See generally Langevoort & Thompson, IPOs, supra note 7, at 895–909 (discussing the 
“devolution” of the Securities Act’s restraints on IPOs and marketing since 1933). 
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Eliminating the presumption against suitability, moreover, requires the 
availability of some public information vetted through collective external 
diligence. Listing markets may borrow specific disclosure requirements 
from any number of sources.252 As Professor Jose Miguel Mendoza 
suggests, the threshold for minimum disclosure is not as critical as the 
freedom to provide enough information to attract trading interest by 
institutional and accredited investors and thereby to have access to the 
deeper liquidity provided by the addition of retail investors in subsequent 
tiers.253 Such informal, unstructured information would eventually 
converge on the formal requirements of Exchange Act reporting in order to 
access such higher tiers.254 
Because reliance on the accuracy of market prices is impossible in an 
inefficient market, market intermediaries (rather than self-certification of 
financial or disclosure controls by an issuer’s management) should assume 
primary responsibility for regulating the quality of such disclosures. A 
number of commentators have suggested civil liability schemes that would 
require issuers to engage investment banks or other intermediaries to 
conduct disclosure audits and face civil liability for false or misleading 
statements.255 In light of the reduced disclosure requirements for this tier, a 
heightened due diligence standard may be appropriate to hold the issuer or 
its sponsor accountable.256  
The more difficult challenge is in developing a system of external 
diligence that balances costs and benefits. Stretching the due diligence 
requirements of the Securities Act over a multi-year period might pose 
undue risk to investment banks and intermediaries.257 Nevertheless, such 
                                                                                                                     
 252. Among other candidates for the minimum disclosure obligations discussed throughout 
this Article are those required by Rule 144A, those required by the quotation and suitability 
requirements applicable to broker–dealers with respect to OTC securities under Rule 15c2-11 and 
FINRA Rule 2114, those contained in standard disclosure covenants in public indentures, or those 
proposed for Tier 2 offerings under the SEC’s proposed revisions to Regulation A. See supra notes 
27, 57, 129, and 241 and accompanying text. 
 253. See Mendoza, supra note 167, at 296–97 (describing the customized compliance provided 
by AIM). 
 254. Cf. Langevoort & Thompson, IPOs, supra note 7, at 918–22 (discussing the information-
filtering role of the informal preliminary prospectus in traditional IPOs under the Securities Act as 
compared to the retrospective “final prospectus” required by the Act). 
 255. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 135, at 913–17 (proposing an external certification regime for 
corporate disclosures); Mendoza, supra note 167, at 316–19 (describing the role of Nominated 
Advisers, or “Nomads,” in preserving the integrity of AIM and shepherding AIM issuers). 
 256. See, e.g., Sjostrom, Rebalancing, supra note 245, at 1162–66 (proposing a civil liability 
scheme for issuers, officers, directors, and placement agents in private placements with a “due 
diligence defense” similar to section 11 of the Securities Act). 
 257. With respect to shelf-registered offerings, underwriters assume ongoing due diligence 
obligations with respect to an issuer’s periodic reporting as issuers take securities “off the shelf,” 
although the scope of section 11 liability in such cases is limited to direct purchasers. See Joseph K. 
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diligence risk may become more manageable if regulators limit diligence to 
annual reports and if issuers and sponsors benefit from good-faith safe 
harbors.258 The risk may be blunted, moreover, by enforcing diligence 
requirements primarily through administrative sanctions259 or requiring 
arbitration of claims.260 Requiring one or more exchanges, investment 
banks, or market makers to publicly quote a security in this tier also 
introduces the issuer and its securities into the public price reporting 
mechanisms, which triggers a range of SRO surveillance mechanisms.261 
An issuer that drops out of this tier—either because it ceases minimum 
disclosure reporting or because it loses market-maker coverage—would 
transition back to the first tier. As a result, the transition from Tier 1 to Tier 
2 could not be taken lightly: firms must either jumpstart secondary market 
trading through a traditional IPO or generate enough institutional interest 
to persuade an exchange or market makers to enter this tier.262 The reverse 
is true as well: firms and their intermediaries seeking to return to Tier 1 
would have to anticipate the implications of withdrawing liquidity from 
unaccredited investors, particularly if such action might subject an issuer to 
                                                                                                                     
Leahy, What Due Diligence Dilemma? Re-Envisioning Underwriters’ Continuous Due Diligence 
After Worldcom, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2001, 2005–07, 2014–16, 2027 (2009).  
 258. This Article envisions that such disclosures would be entitled to the protection covering 
forward-looking statements in Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2014), but not the more definitive 
safe harbor for Exchange Act reporting companies today. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (2012). 
 259.  For example, issuers that fail to meet their disclosure requirements may face delisting or 
lose their eligibility to advance to more liquid tiers, while sponsors that fail to meet their diligence 
obligations may face disqualification from sponsoring similar issuers. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d) 
(enumerating events that disqualify a “bad actor” from placing securities under Rule 506). 
 260. Professor Barbara Black has argued that the use of corporate charters and bylaws to 
require arbitration of securities law disputes are illegal under at least state law, if not federal law. 
Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 802, 851. Nevertheless, recent Delaware cases have suggested an acceptance of forum-
selection bylaws. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 938 
(Del. Ch. 2013). The SEC and listing exchanges might deem such provisions inconsistent with the 
requirements for companies trading in Tier 3. To the extent that there is no expectation of public 
reliance on market prices under the Basic doctrine, courts will not likely recognize the availability 
of class actions in any event. See supra text accompanying note 76 (explaining the Basic doctrine). 
 261. While this Article’s proposal recognizes the link between OTC market making and 
involuntary reporting, neither the issuer nor the market maker can act alone. See supra text 
accompanying note 42. Under the proposal, issuers cannot be eligible for public trading and thus 
escape suitability constraints without a market maker to sponsor trading, and market makers may 
not quote prices in securities without the availability of minimum disclosures.  
 262. For well-connected firms, the flexibility to choose between tiers may be desirable. 
Venture capital and private equity firms, for example, might appreciate the freedom to negotiate an 
underwritten offering or a commitment to market making depending on the nature of the security 
and the degree of retail and institutional interest. For firms that do not qualify for the VC fast track, 
market makers and SROs that operate both private secondary markets and public over-the-counter 
markets would be free to devote resources toward helping issuers phase across platforms without 
incurring the expense and risk of an IPO. 
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liability for breach of fair dealing under state law or subject intermediaries 
to liability if they breach representations as to liquidity. 
C.  Tier 3: An Efficient Market for Pricing Securities 
The third tier encompasses firms that trade in a sufficiently efficient 
market to warrant application of higher compliance obligations. To qualify 
for this tier, an exchange would have to determine that the issuer’s 
securities meet the exchange’s criteria for price efficiency.263 Such firms 
would thereafter undertake to comply with disclosure rules designed to 
ensure broad, continuous dissemination of information. These rules might 
include enhanced financial and disclosure reporting controls, audit 
committee requirements, selective disclosure prohibitions, and real-time 
disclosure requirements. Policy makers might also require such firms to 
comply with corporate governance requirements designed to improve 
reporting accuracy and accountability to shareholders.264 
The function of this tier is essentially to reinvigorate the role of a 
traditional exchange listing in screening firms for liquidity and price 
efficiency. Since the Basic decision, courts have, for good or for ill, 
usurped this role from the exchanges.265 The Basic test essentially 
supersedes the function of exchanges in identifying firms whose securities 
trade in a relatively efficient market based on largely quantitative and 
empirical factors.266 Rather than relying on a judicial determination of 
efficiency in the context of an adversarial process (particularly one 
disfavored by courts), a regulatory or self-regulatory authority (such as a 
stock exchange’s listing board) ought to make determinations of efficiency 
in accordance with an administrative process that weighs the costs and 
benefits of recognizing the market for a firm’s securities as relatively 
efficient. 
To the extent that federal securities law favors seasoned Exchange Act 
reporting companies in a variety of regulatory contexts,267 only Tier 3 and 
Tier 4 companies would have access to these regulatory benefits under this 
Article’s proposal. For example, there may be less need to regulate follow-
                                                                                                                     
 263. This proposal would not prohibit exchanges from listing securities in lower tiers. Instead, 
as discussed above, this Article envisions that exchanges would establish national market tiers that 
correspond to the gradations of publicness this Part of the Article outlines. 
 264. Enhancing proxy solicitation rules, proxy expenditure rules, institutional nomination 
procedures, compensation oversight, and other corporate governance initiatives may only make 
sense in markets with a sufficient institutional participation to ensure their judicious use. To the 
extent that Congress has restricted the application of many of its enhanced corporate governance 
requirements to listed companies, the reservation of such requirements to Tier 3 is consistent with 
Congress’s current policy. 
 265. See supra text accompanying notes 75–77. 
 266. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 267.  See supra note 78. 
57
Dombalagian: Principles for Publicness
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
706 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
on offerings or affiliate resales in a market where professional trading 
interest, rather than managerial speculation, arguably sets prices.268 
Extensions of credit against securities collateral are likewise reasonable if 
publicly reported prices bear a fair relationship to the liquidation value of a 
security.269 Antifraud laws may further limit liability for forward-looking 
statements and other soft information to the extent that professional traders 
are able to filter them critically.270 
Meanwhile, the option to delist to Tier 2 instead of Tier 1 may mitigate 
the negative impact of voluntary and involuntary delisting from Tier 3. 
While some firms may prefer to avoid public markets altogether, the option 
to reduce the cost of disclosures and controls while retaining retail 
investors in Tier 2 may appeal to some firms, particularly those required to 
delist for failure to meet qualitative listing standards.271 A negotiated 
transition from Tier 3 to Tier 2, with the prospect of relisting, may blunt 
the immediate outflow of institutional investors from delisted companies 
as well.272 
D.  Tier 4: A Market for Representative Issuers 
The final tier might entice large firms that are representative of their 
industries’ business practices to provide greater social disclosures as a 
condition of representation in nationally-recognized indices and the 
heightened liquidity available to the component securities of such 
indices.273 Listed firms would opt into this tier by undertaking to comply 
with enhanced disclosures about their business operations and the impact 
they have on stakeholders other than shareholders. In return, policy makers 
would, as they do in some respects today, recognize national and sector 
indices comprised of such securities as suitable underlying instruments for 
listed index products.274  
                                                                                                                     
 268. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 269. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 270. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (2012) (stating the safe harbor requirements for forward-looking 
statements under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 64–66. 
 271. Professor Macey and his co-authors observe that a significant percentage of regulatory 
delistings are due to the failure to meet quantitative criteria only loosely related to the reduced 
profitability of exchange trading. See Macey et al., supra note 199, at 692. They suggest that 
regulators should mandate delisting of otherwise solvent companies only in the case of “fraud or 
illegal activity,” while relaxing quantitative benchmarks if there is sufficient volume to sustain 
liquidity or an increase in listing fees to subsidize the provision of liquidity. Id. at 711–12. 
 272. See, e.g., id. at 698 (observing the high institutional trading volume that immediately 
follows delisting as institutional investors rebalance portfolios to offload such securities). 
 273. See Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 375 (proposing “a distinct 
class of systemically significant public issuers” upon whom “[p]ublicly reactive regulation (and 
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One of the goals index providers strive to achieve in composing an 
index is to “clearly convey the economic realities of the underlying interest 
it seeks to measure to its users.”275 Investors in broad-based indices, such 
as the S&P 500, seek exposure to systematic macroeconomic risks while 
canceling out industry- or firm-specific risks through diversification.276 
Investors in sector indices similarly seek exposure to a sector of the 
market, including the political, social, and economic factors affecting 
specific industries.277 To the extent that the content of social policy 
disclosures relates to the business prospects of a firm, it is probably due to 
the systematic risk of legislation, regulation, or public pressure affecting all 
firms within an economic region or sector.278 Disclosures by a handful of 
representative issuers might therefore suffice to establish a baseline 
understanding of how relevant industries operate.  
Meanwhile, inclusion in an index gives issuers privileged access to a 
broader pool of passive investors. Index-linked funds have increasingly 
become investments of choice for individual retirement plans, mutual 
funds, and other forms of passive investment.279 Trading activity in futures 
and options markets similarly fosters liquidity in the component securities 
underlying an index.280 Regulators may also consider increasing net capital 
                                                                                                                     
most of the inchoate social agenda) would presumably be concentrated,” in order to leave “small 
and mid-cap companies . . . free of the unintended burdens of publicness”). 
 274. Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(35)(B)(i); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(55)(C)(i)(III)(aa) (linking exclusion from 
the definition of “narrow-based security index” to the reporting status of an issuer under section 12 
of the Exchange Act).  
 275. BD. OF INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, FINANCIAL BENCHMARKS: CONSULTATION REPORT 10 
(Jan. 2013), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD399.pdf. 
 276. Shareholders that hold a diversified, leveraged portfolio may be largely indifferent to the 
risk-return ratio of individual portfolio companies. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 210 (7th ed. 2003) (asserting that “investors who 
can . . . borrow and lend at the risk-free rate of interest should choose the best common stock 
portfolio regardless of their attitudes to risk” under the capital asset pricing model). 
 277. See Patrick J. Collins, Prudence, 124 BANKING L.J. 29, 61 (2007) (discussing the benefits 
of sector diversification); William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded 
Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69, 95 
(2008) (discussing the dangers of index products targeted at highly specialized or narrow sectors). 
 278. Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 1, at 372–74 (discussing the 
permeation of socio-political externalities in disclosure regulation). 
 279. See HARRIS, supra note 42, at 488 (describing the appeal of index funds to passive 
investors); Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 279, 301 (2000) (proposing to “limit unsophisticated investors to investments in only passive 
index mutual funds”). 
 280. See HARRIS, supra note 42, at 489 (noting that program trading in index components 
accounts for a substantial percentage of trading on the NYSE). There is a significant literature 
debating whether inclusion in an index leads to a permanent increase in the market value of selected 
firms. See, e.g., Maria Kasch & Asani Sarkar, Is There an S&P 500 Index Effect? 1 (Mar. 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2171235 (finding that, 
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haircuts, reducing margin requirements, and generally tying other 
regulatory privileges to the enhanced liquidity enjoyed by such 
securities.281 
Although the Exchange Act does not directly regulate indices today, 
both U.S. and international regulatory developments are bringing index 
composition and calculation under increasing regulatory scrutiny, 
particularly with respect to the integrity of component securities.282 
Moreover, to the extent that most retail trading in derivatives products 
takes place on an exchange,283 exchanges can easily impose disclosure 
requirements on component securities as a condition for listing broad-
based and sector-based index products.284 Large firms might of course 
forgo inclusion in an index if they believe the costs of enhanced disclosure 
exceed the reputational and commercial benefits. Even so, general 
principles of materiality may compel such firms to disclose deviations in 
their business practices from those of representative issuers.285 
 
                                                                                                                     
contrary to the consensus in the literature, index inclusion has no permanent effect on value and 
comovement after accounting for the extraordinary preinclusion performance of component 
securities).  
 281. For example, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recognizes common equity 
shares included in a major stock index to be Level 2B “high-quality liquid assets” for purposes of 
calculating the liquidity coverage ratio for financial institutions. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY 
RISK MONITORING TOOLS ¶ 54(c) (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf. 
 282. See, e.g., Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Indices Used as Benchmarks in Financial Instruments and Financial Contracts, art. 19, 
COM/2013/0641 Final (proposing to restrict the ability of certain supervised entities to use 
benchmarks that are not subject to EU or equivalent regulation); BD. OF INT’L ORG. OF SEC. 
COMM’N, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL BENCHMARKS: FINAL REPORT 20–22 (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD415.pdf (proposing a framework for 
regulating standard benchmarks); Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, 
Promise and Failure of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 42–51 (2013) (discussing these 
developments). 
 283. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (prohibiting trading in futures otherwise than by or 
through a designated contract market); HARRIS, supra note 42, at 50–58 (surveying trading markets 
for retail index options, futures, and other derivatives). 
 284.  For example, for an issuer’s securities to be eligible for inclusion in an index, an 
exchange might require the issuer not only to agree to provide the exchange with all material 
information relevant to the individual firm and the market in which it competes, but also to provide 
additional information to Congress and the SEC via legislation or rule making relating specifically 
to their business practices. 
 285. Some firms may benefit from actual changes in regulatory policy that affect their 
competitors (and therefore have an incentive to disclose how their business practices deviate from 
the norm). Others may be disadvantaged by anticipated changes in regulatory policy (and therefore 
may face the risk of litigation if their disclosure practices fail materially to describe how changes in 
regulatory policy may affect their business). 
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CONCLUSION 
The privileges and obligations of public companies must evolve with 
the needs of markets. Regulators play a critical role in standardizing those 
privileges and obligations, but issuers, investors, and market intermediaries 
must ultimately make informed trade-offs based on evolving market 
conditions. A principles-based system of public company regulation may 
empower issuers and regulated intermediaries to make such calculations 
within an intuitive framework that is resilient in the face of shifting 
political winds and market cycles. 
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